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INTRODUCTION

In this treatise we attempt to examine
critically and develop sys-

tematically Sartre* s theory of consciousness as
it appears principally in
his major philosophical work. Being and Nothingness
.

We do not intend to

cover the entire scope of Sartre *s existential
thought.

Our primary inter-

est is focused on the interpretation of his theory
of consciousness as

developed in his phenomenological ontology.

More particularly, we will

show that Sartre* s aim in his Being and Nothingness is
to describe, by
means of a phenomenological approach, the failure of the
"Being-for-itself"
(human consciousness) in its relentless attempt to identify
itself with

"Being-in-itself" (reality ocher than human consciousness; the "massive"
and "full" being as Sartre calls it).

All theories of consciousness are at least to some extent speculative
and hence must confront the challenge of that formidable foe which is none
other than the challenge of analytical philosophy.

And since, in contem—

porary philosophy, the schism between analytical and existential philosophies appears almost irreparable it is imperative that all philosophers who

concern themselves with existential thought meet this challenge rather than

simply dismiss it as mere "unimportant nonsense" (to borrow one of
Wittgenstein* s favorite expressions).

treatise by confronting this challenge.

To this end, then, we commence our
In the first part of this paper we

provide a brief discussion of the limitations of analytical philosophy

which render it inadequate to provide a careful and detailed description
of the human consciousness.

And moreover, it appears to us that the metho-
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dological limitations and the restricted and
fragmentary manner of philosophizing, which is characteristic of analytical
philosophy, prevent it from

accommodating an adequate theory of consciousness#
Phenomenology, in contrast to analytical philosophy, is
geared toward
the investigation of consciousness.

Indeed, phenomenology is a discipline

whose primary concern is to provide a description of the human
consciousness
and the objects of consciousness as they appear to consciousness.

Phenomeno-

logy, therefore, seems to be a particularly appropriate method
for the formu-

lation of a theory of consciousness.

And since Sartre sought to resolve

the problem of consciousness from a phenomenological basis we provide an

adumbrative exposition on the phenomenological method in the latter section
of the first part.

For a clear understanding of Sartre* s phenomenological ontology it is
imperative to recognize the influence of two phenomenologists, namely,
Husserl and Heidegger, on Sartre.

The theories of these two philosophers

form the basis of Sartre* s phenomenological ontology.

Our second part is,

therefore, devoted to the explication of some of the theories of these

philosophers that are particularly relevant to Sartre *s phenomenological

ontology and his theory of consciousness.
In the third part our main purpose is to develop systematically Sartre *s

phenomenological description of the two regions of Being:

"Being-for-itself"

and "Being-in-itself ," their characteristics, their relations, their interactions and their activities.

Through detailed discussions of Sartre*s

phenomenological approach, his initial postulates, his theories of negation
and Nothingness, his concept of "bad faith" and his characterizations of
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"Beine-for-itsalf" and "Boins-in-its.lf .« w.
8how

s.*™.

flrst> nathodl _

oally empties the "Being-for-ltself" of
most of its being ! second, fill,
the "Belng-in-itself.. with being, and.
third, thus creates an hiatus be.
tween the two regions of Being, only
to demonstrate that a synthesis

between the two regions of Being is unattainable.

In the last section of

this part we recapitulate the main points of the
previous seetioe to sub-

stantiate our conclusion that for Sartre the unification
of the two regions

of Being into a synthetic whole is an impossibility.
ai

the final part of this treatise we seek to show
that Sartre* s initial

postulates upon which his entire system is based are unwarranted
and untenable.

Moreover, his "phenomenological method*’ cannot justifiably
be des-

cribed as phenomenological, at least not in the strict Husserlian
sense of
the term.

Here we also challenge his characterization of the "Being-for-

itself’* as an empty and impersonal non-being.

From our criticisms it would

appear that Sartre fails in his project to show the impossibility of
synthesis between the two regions of Being.

a

However, despite this apparent

failure, he makes a measurable contribution to the problem of Being, and

above all he succeeds in indicating the limitations of phenomenology in
resolving the problem of consciousness and the problem of Being.

•

PART I

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL
PHILOSOPHY

A*

limitations of Analytical Philosophy
The philosophical attitude
prevalent in the English-speaking
coun-

tries exhibits a profound distrust
for all "Speculative philosophies"
that dominated the German thought
in the nineteenth century. This
distrust soon resulted in an almost
complete disregard for all speculative
systems, including its more recent
mode, that of Sartrean "phenomenological ontology." This skepticism is
at least partially Justified by the

extravagances of German speculative thought,
which indeed, in some
instances, is both obscure and incoherent.

From this attitude, then.

emerged a new philosophical movement,
commonly known as the analytical

movement
The group of philosophers known as the
analytical philosophers, con-

trary to the popular impression, does not constitute a
school.

Although

they share the common belief that philosophy must be
approached from a
scientific viewpoint, and indeed it is their claim that they have
succeeded

where Kant had failed, namely, in finding a way "to set philosophy
upon the
sure ptth of science," which is a dubious claim, they hold no
distinctive

common thecis.

Some have thought, erroneously, that the unifying thesis

can be found in the verifiability theory of meaning.

But this theory,

although of prime importance, has many different formulations, of which
not one is commonly agreed upon.

Moreover, even the interests of these

philosophers are at variance? the earlier positivists were interested in
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the empirical verification of
propositions which would, in turn, determine the meaningfulness of such sentences,
whereas the later linguistic

analysts were primarily concerned with
the study of language as the tool
of knowledge.

The vast profusion of literature that
has been published

in the past five decades, and the rapidity
with which the movement

evolved render it impossible to provide a
comprehensive and detailed

review of the entire analytical movement.

However, it will be fruitful

here to critically evaluate a few theories
of its major exponents that are

particularly relevant and to show their methodological
limitations in pro-

viding a theory of consciousness.
It is generally recognized py students of philosophy
that logical

positivism is the root from whioh later movements grew.

Thus, an exposi-

tion on analytical philosophy will do well to begin with this
movement
and attempt to fix on some of its central points.

In this regard there

seem to be at least four major theses which are central to all
positivists;
these are (1) logical atomism, more specifically, the theory that all
complex statements of fact are in fact compound statements which depend
for their truth on simple statements about sense experience, and, furthermore, these are independent statements which do not entail any other;
(2) the verifiability theory of meaning, which claims that a statement

means precisely that which would verify it in sense experience, or

’’the

meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification”; (3) the analytical character of a priori knowledge, i.e., that all necessary state-

ments unfold the contents of our ideas rather than report truths about
nature; (4) the emotive theory of value, i.e., that statements of value

6

are neither true nor false, but
expressions of attitude . 1 Of these four
theses, the verifiability theory
of meaning is the most important and

interesting for our purposes, for if this
theory is true, then any

general speculative theory concerning the
human consciousness would be,
ir:

principle, impossible.

This theory implies the assumption that every-

thing that could be said could be expressed
in terms of elementary statements, i.e., the theory of logical atomism.
°f* £.

The theory on the character

priori knowledge and the emotive theory of value are not
particu-

larly relevant, since they do not have any important bearing
on the
question of the possibility of a theory of consciousness.

We shall thus

confine ourselves primarily to an investigation of the verifiability

theory of meaning, and any mention of the theory of logical atomism will
be purely incidental, in that it will serve only to implement our understanding of the verifiability principle.
The common exaltation of science and the aversion to metaphysics

have been of fundamental importance in shaping the course of investigation ventured by the logical positivists.

Closely related to these atti-

tudes is their stress of sense experience as the terminus
quQPi of our thinking, and their

a_

quo and ad

deep suspicion of any talk of universals

or necessary connections outside the fields of logic and mathematics.

Their attitude of disdain for all noncognitive enterprises, suoh as the
formulation of universal value theories, which they believe, strictly
speaking, are not the concern of the philosopher, since his task is

limited to clearing up the theoretical puzzles about methods and meanings
left behind by the scientists, led them to brand these as emotive and.
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consequently, unworthy of serious attention.

If this conception of

philosophy prevails, then the business of philosophy must be degraded
to
that of a handmaiden of science.

dreary and bleak matter.

Philosophy thus regarded is indeed a

It would seem from this that all that is left

for the philosopher is a universe of sense contents.

It is true, that no

positivist ever maintained this explicitly! however, it is nevertheless

tacitly implied in their claim that when a remark about what is not sensible is ventured, this remark, although not false, is meaningless.

Implicit in this unverifiable claim is the argument that an assertion is
a statement of fact; and if we are clear as to what is asserted, we must

be able to recognize that experience or those experiences that will verify
this assertion.

Thus, when making an assertion we must always refer to

the relevant experience, namely, sense experience*

If this theory is

true, the implications that it entails are devastating to our present

project, for it would not only render any theory about the human con-

sciousness implausible, but it would prime facie rule it out as unthink-

able and meaningless.

We must now inquire in what sense, if any, this

theory is true.
In attempting to make their investigations appear "scientific," the

positivists chose to restrict their discussions of meaning in such a manner

that they would not include any mention of the noetic process, for such a
process would clearly entail in it the problem of consciousness, which,
as it were, is not publicly verifiable, let alone conclusively verifiable.

From this it becomes obvious why the positivists designed the verifia-

bility principle to be an empirical test, which admits only sense

8

experience as evidence, to determine the object
meant.

This resulted in

their emphasis on the sensory rather than the
introspective or any other

mode of verification.

Formulated in this restricted manner, this prin-

ciple has proved incapable of accommodating the vast
profusion of facts,

which clearly is not limited to sense experience alone.

Thus, there has

not been a single empiricist theory of meaning commonly
aeoepted among the

positivists; instead, there has been a succession of theories,
each sub-

sequent one benefiting from the errors of the preceding one.

Our most

feasible approach, then, would appear to be to systematically analyze
the

main phases in the development of the verifiability theory and to show

how each successive one fails to cover those experiences which are necessary for the formulation of a theory of consciousness.
The first stage of the verifiability principle was formulated by

Wittgenstein in his Tractatus of 1922.

2

Here he argued that ’’everything

that can be thought at all can be thought clearly, ”^and ’’everything that
can be said can be said clearly.”^ For Wittgenstein the criterion of mean-

ingful statements is their coincidence with facts, and this coincidence is

verified through these very facts of ”my world,” and what ”my world” consists of is the realm of sensibly and instantaneously given atomic facts,

to which only I have access.

Strictly

s pea Icing, \re

cannot refer to this

”my world” as the field of consciousness or even as immediate experience,
for these would imply an ex periencing agent, and this is not permissible
in Wlttgensteinian language, since any reference to a "self” would be

vacuous talk, for there oould be no empirical verification that would
sustain this ’’self.”"*
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or two reasons this theory would
clearly cripple any attempt to
establish a theory of consciousness.
First, all communication with other

minds—which

is presupposed in every theory of
oonsciousness-would be

impossible, owing to the privacy of access
to the atomic facts to which

all meaningful statements must, in the end,
refer.

And there is no reason

to suppose that objects are anything other
than groups of atomic facts

which, because they are simple, are not subject
to further analysis nor,
therefore, to definition or description.

If the atomic facts are incapable

of definition or description, what could serve as
the common denominators

through which communication is made possible?

The objects themselves?

Indeed no, for these objects are merely aggregates of
atomic facts, and

atomic facts are private and incommunicable.

If communication with other

minds is impossible, then any theory that purports to generalize
certain

characteristics about consciousness is no more than a string of meaningless words.

Secondly, this theory would remove any talk about other minds and

would relegate such conjecture to the category of vacuous talk.
take, for example, the sentence

inside his watch.”

n Peter

let us

believes that there is a leprechaun

Now for two reasons this sentence is meaningless in

-Vittgensteinian language.

(1) In accordance with Wittgenstein »s exten-

tionalist logic, it was maintained that all compound propositions are truth
functions of the propositions they contained.^ But in our example the com-

pound sentence, ’’Peter believes that there is a leprechaun inside his

watch,” does not depend for its truth upon the truth of its subordinate
proposition, namely, "there is a leprechaun inside his watch.”

Hence such
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a sentence is not a proposition
asserting a state of affairs.

(2) Since

it is obviously the case that Peter'»s
belief is not directly verifiable ,

this sentence makes no claim beyond the
empirically verifiable one that

Peter uttered a sequence of sounds.

In this regard all sentences that

purport to tell of the consciousness of other
minds must be discarded as
•'unimportant nonsense.- 7 But when a positivist stands
in a communicative

relation with another Subject, he is not merely
apprehending a sequence
of perceptible sounds uttered by this Subject.

He understands the meaning

of the sounds which are but the expression by means
of which another auto-

nomous consciousness, with the capacity to organize, to
construct, and so
on, manifests itself.

And repudiating the postulation of another con-

sciousness like my own seems to be, at best, an arbitrary
choice.

There

are other weaknesses with this theory, but suffice here to say
that such
a theory is incompatible with any and all theories
of consciousness.

We have seen from the above discussion of his theory that Wittgenstein
bed remained unwaveringly faithful to two
of Schlick»s original and funda-

mental theses:

first, "that a factual proposition refers to empirical

O

fact alone," and second, "that this fact was always what its assertor would

regard as the best warrant for the truth of his assertion." 0 These theses

were reverentially adhered to by the positivists through all their later
variations of the verifiability principle. 10
Kow we come to the second stage.

Here those positivists who felt

Wittgenstein* s theory too cramping to be borne, sought to loosen the veri-

fication principle, but nevertheless they retained the important position
that that which a person refers to must in some sense be verified by that

n
particular person.

Thus the theory has here acquired a new
appearance

which centers around the phrase "what might be
verified by me."

And indeed

this revised version was able to cover many
statements in its net of mean-

ingful statements that have been ostracized as verbal
waste by Wittgenstein »s

rather extraordinary criterion of meaningfulness.

But unfortunately even

in this new dressing the theory still obviates any hope
for a meaningful
inspection of consciousness other than my own.
The third stage again attempted a more
inclusive theory

the range of the verifiable.

A new qualification was added:

by extending
in sum, it

stipulated that the net of meaningful statements in inclusive of all
those
statements that

might in principle verify. ^However, there is a draw-

back to this seemingly plausible theory, and that is, it demands the verification to be co/^clus^ye .

The covert assumption underlying this theory

is that ultimately meaning must make reference to ostensive definitions,

and nothing less will serve.

And Schlick held that "the statement that

two experiences of different subjects not only occupy corresponding places

in a systematic order, but also resemble each other qualitatively, has for
us no sense.

Note that it is not false, but senseless (sinnlos); we have

no idea what it means."

13

Conjointly, these two theses, namely, meaning

must ultimately refer to ostensive definitions, and the equipollence of
experiences of different subjects, lead either to the elimination of all
statements about the experiences of other people, since such statements

cannot be ostensively sustained nor is the equipollence of experiences of

different subjects conclusively verifiable, or else to the reduction of
other people* s experience to one*s own, namely to redefine the experience

"
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of other people in terns of their
empirical manifestations-thet is.
in
terns of the overt behavior of their
bodies and ultimately in terns of
my
sense contents. Strictly speaking
of course, it is meaningless to speak
of experience of "other people" unless
we define this experience in terms
of my sense contents*

bile positivists such as Ayer adhered
closely to this form of dogmatic
behaviorism, others like Oamap and lemoel
preferred the even more radical
^
form of "physicalism.” 1
In this peculiar brand of physicallsm
it was maintained that whenever

a person makes a statement such as "I an
angry," and we accept this state-

ment to be true, what we in effect accept are
the physical manifestations

of the person* s body, i.e., his verbalizations,
his clenching of his fist,
his facial contortions, and ultimately the changes
in his neurones.

What

is meant here is that there is not only a "logical
equivalence" between the

"physical" and the "mental," but there is also an "identity
of content"

between the two; and this process was known as the translation
of the
"mental" into the "physical. 15 What the physicalists have actually
done

was to make a leap from the logical equivalence, which demands that
both
the statement about consciousness and about the overt behavioral mani-

festations must be true or false simultaneously, to the claim of identity
of content.

Resolving one content into the other in this manner is clearly

unacceptable, for "uniform accompaniment is not identity. "^This view was
soon abandoned by Carnap, who admitted with oandor the untenability of

this theory.

He writes:

"A person sometimes knows he is angry without

applying any of those procedures which another person would have to
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apply ...»17„Anser is not the

sa!Tie

as tte novements by

^ioh an an(-ry

organism reacts to his environment ...” 18
It is, in short, an experience
and not a bodily reaction. later
Carnap reformulated this theory
into a
milder version? here he replaces
’’translatable*'

by ’’reducible.”

However,

the logical equivalence was still
maintained, but now the observable

bodily reactions are referred to as

” symptoms” 19 (Carnap)

or "test condi-

tions"

(Ilempel) of anger, and we are to

alone.

Although his modification was aimed at a
compromise, it fell short

of its goal.

verify our judgments by these

For if "reducibility” implies that the mental
assertion can

be reducible to the physical in meaning or
content asserted, then we have

physical! sm all over again.

And if it means that the mental assertion

refers to a state of consciousness, then it has
succumbed to eonmon sense.
Let us now examine a few of the difficulties inherent
in this theory.
(1) If the "physical symptoms” are parallel to the states of
consciousness

of other people, then this uniform accompaniment must be observable.

But

no state of consciousness belonging to another person is,
in principle,

observable by another person.
parallel?

(2) In the present

How, then, are we justified in drawing a

form this theory assumes that for every con-

scious event there is a physical correlate? however, even if this were
true, there is no way of maintaining it.

The positivists allow for only

two kinds of statements, analytic and synthetic.

But the above assertion

is not analytic, for the identity of the states of consciousness and the

physical manifestations is no longer maintained.

Nor, for that matter, is

it a synthetic statement, for states of consciousness are not verifiable by

the other subjects.

Thus the theory here is not only unestablished but

»
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meaningless,

moreover, .ven if

„

allow for the verification of
conscious

events by other subjects, this
verification can never be exhaustive
and,
consequently, never conclusive.
Let us here recapitulate some of
the

min

points of this view and

assess its plausibility in providing
an adequate theory of consciousness.

W® haVC S6em how the first v ^sion of Carnap*
s physicalism
as was later recognized by Carnap
himself.

is inaeeeptable,

Yet the modified version,

which could be an intelligible and natural
view as urged by the positivists. becomes rampant with contradictions and
incoherences, for their

methodology does not permit such a theory.

If we accept the physicalists

view that the consciousness of men, in its rich
proliferations, is not. as
distinct from its physical manifestations, a true object
of knowledge at
all. then any philosopher who choses not to speak
of the consciousness in

physical terms must remain silent.

The untenable consequences of physi-

calism would seem to suggest that we should search for

a

theory of con-

sciousness elsewhere.
The inadequacies of the third interpretation made it necessary
to once

again reformulate the verifiability principle.

According to the fourth

interpretation, a statement is meaningful if it might, in principle, be

verified by anyone at all.

Yet according to Professor Schlick, the stipu-

lation that the verification must be conclusive must still be retained here.
Such is the emphasis on the conclusiveness of verification that we are per-

suaded to regard it as nothing less than a central doctrine for the positivists.
'dhen J

speak of the consciousnesses of other people, how can I con-
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clusively verify their existence?

No finite number of instances will

enable me to have conclusive evidence
that other people possess consciousness, for this would necessitate
nothing short of completing an infinite

series, and it is always conceivable
that in the future a contrary in-

stance might appear.
It is evident that this theory, as
urged by Schlick, must now be aban-

doned.

As Professor Ayer pointed out very
forcefully, no statement of

fact is conclusively verifiable.

He further maintained that "if this is

correct, the principle that a sentence is factually
significant only if it

expresses what is conclusively verifiable is
self-stultifying as

terion of significance.

a

cri-

For it leads to the conclusion that it is impos-

sible to make a statement of fact at all."^
In a fifth attempt the positivists were finally
convinced that the

insistence on conclusiveness proved to be a liability rather than
an
asset, and this demand was abandoned in Professor Ayer's new
proposal in

the second edition of his Language Truth and Logic .

Here he distin-

guished between strong, or conclusive, and weak verification.

He writes;

"A proposition is said to be verified in the strong sense
of the term if,

and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience.
Biit

it is verifiable in the weak sense if it is possible for experience

to render it probable."

fc

"We say that the question must be asked about any

putative statement of fact is not.
or falsehood logically certain?

Would any observation make its truth

but 8lmply ’ Would any observnUor’ ba rele -

vant to the determination of its truth or falsehood?

And it is only if a

negative answer is given to this second question that we conclude that the
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statement is considered nonsensical."23
ThlB

ls , olaar adTan(, e

over the previous attempts, for it
readily admitted propositions about
other people's minds, since ve can at
least claim that their ostensible
behavior is relevant in determining
the truth or falsehood of these propositions.
Though regarding these propositions
Professor Ayer continued
to hold, with less than apodeictic
certainty, his behavioristic view.

The

problem with this criterion was no longer
its exclusion of meaningful
statements but its inclusion of statements as
meaningful that are in fact,

by the fiat of common sense, meaningless.
In an article titled '’Meaninglessness"
published in Kind, Ayer refor-

mulated this theory in more technical terms.

He writes:

"Let us call a

proposition which records an actual or possible observation
an experiential proposition.

Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine

factual proposition that some experlental propositions can be
deduoed from
it in conjunction with certain other premises without being
dedueible

from those other premises alone."

But this new criterion, as Isaiah

Berline noted, would allow one to meaningfully say, "This logical problem
is bright green"; and with the aid of amother premise, "I dislike all shades

of green," one could deduce a verifiable conclusion not dedueible from

either premise alone, namely, "I dislike this logical problem, "~^which is

obviously a manifest absurdity.

Indeed, some ten years later Ayer himself

recognized the untenability of this criterion and abandoned it.

Clearly,

then, as a criterion for meaningfulness, this theory is unsatisfactory.
It would seem that the repeated necessity for readjustment and improvi-

zation and revision would have, with constraining evidence, indicated the

s
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futility of pursuing this task of establishing an
acceptable verifiability
principle.

However, although this movement became relatively
stagnant in

Britain, it took a new course in America.

The emphasis now shifted from

de facto verification to language—a language free from the
vestiges of
archaic metaphysics and obscurities , in which the components
would include only logical symbols and subjects and predicates that refer
to observ-

able (sensible) things.

Thus the criterion for meaningfulness now becomes

that of translatability into this empirical language.

Insofar as the

logical constants and quantifiers are concerned, they bear no great im-

portance for us.

And as for the phrase ’’observable predicates,” this

sieve proves equivocal if it admits such unobservables as other people*

consciousnesses, and it begs the question if it excludes them as meaningless.

Hence, many of our previous criticisms are applicable here, for

instance, reference to observable or sensible things as a criterion of

meaningfulness.

Although this modification was meant to be a measurable

advance over previous attempts, it too proved implausible.
We have reviewed the main stages in the development of the verifia-

bility theory; to some we devoted brief attention, and others we dealt

with in considerable detail.

From this we can safely say that through its

different variations a two-fold thesis was consistently and persistently
upheld.

On the one hand the meaning of a statement is precisely that

which would secure its truth; and on the other hand, regarding facts, only
sense experience can bring certainty of truth.

thesis that ultimately all forms converged.

It is toward this dual

This dual thesis, if held,

would inevitably rule out any attempt that purports to theorize about

”
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consciousness.

This emphasis on meaning-inspection,
hardly objectionable

in its right place, tends toward dogmatism
when it oversteps its rightful
sphere. The range of empirical
actualities is certainly not limited
to
sense experience alone.

personal cense contents,

And by reducing all empirical
actualities to ny
1

invariably omit vast realms of nonperceptible

data such as all historical facts,
psychological facts that constitute an
individual’ 3 psychic life, and everyday
communication with others.

If

philosophy neglects these perennial data which bear
incommensurable consequences to one’s life, then philosophy is but a
form of intellectual

gymnastics.

And in eliminating theories of consciousness, as did
the

positivists, in what I believe to be an arbitrary manner,
it subtracts

from itself that very margin of credibility.
Let us now turn to the later developments of analytical
philosophy

known as linguistic philosophy,

here those analytical philosophers who

were critical of the insurmountable difficulties brought about by the
positivistic approach sought a new course.
the new idea:

From these philosophers emerged

that the assumption in advance that what one means will fall

neatly into preconceived categories is unwarranted.

A statement must speak

for itself; it nay have its own kind of meaning, and that kind of meaning
its own logic.

The key to these varieties of weaning is language.

Only

through the nuances of language can we explore the manifold content of
idea, impulse, and feeling that human beings can express.

is no longer that of searching for meaning but

"

The rule here

look for the use .

The earlier forms of linguistic analysis are variegated and numerous.
However, we shall limit our discussion to three:

the common sense theory
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of Q. S. Moore (although, strictly speaking,
his philosophy is not solely

linguistic analysis, Moore did pioneer the
linguistic movement, and his

influence on the later forms of linguistic
analysis is incommensurable); 26
N * lVjaloolm,s theory of common usage;
and Ayer’s application of Russell’s

theory of "definite description" and his theory
of "logical constructions."
In 1925 Professor Moore published what
many analysts consider to be his

singularly most important work, "A Defense of Common
Sense."

In this

essay he suggested the efficacy of common sense and
its language to provide
the genuine philosophical problems on the one hand, and
the criterion to

determine the genuineness of speculative claims on the other.

He further

held that even apparently trivial deviations from ordinary
(standard)
language may result in the infiltration of pseudo-philosophical
problems,

and that those philosophical statements that violate ordinary language
are
false.

Ihus, to resolve any theory of consciousness we must ultimately

make ordinary language our court of appeal.

But precisely because ordi-

nary language and common sense, with their profusion of ambiguities,
vagaries, and lack of certainty do not even ask the question "Are there

other consciousnesses like mine?" let alone provide the sort of answer
the philosopher seeks, they are inadequate to serve as tools for the formu-

lation of a theory of consciousness.

The main difficulty with Moore’s

proposal seems to be the extension of jurisdiction of common sense and

ordinary language into realms where their arbitrations are ineffective.
Professor Malcolm believed that Moore’s fundamental proposal was sound,

and that its difficulties could be remedied by stressing the importance of
language.

According to Professor Malcolm, when philosophers depart from
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common sense, what they are really doing
is misusing words; he writes “the
philosophizing of the more important
philosophers has consisted in their

more or less subtly repudiating ordinary
language. "^However, he maintained
that under certain conditions, common sense,
when using language correctly,
could not be mistaken.

These conditions stipulated that any expression

employed should have (1) a descriptive and
(2) an underivative use. 28Thus
regarded, "it is not possible for an ordinary
form of speech to be improper.

That is to say, ordinary language is correct
language, ,,2 ^and

cannot produce false statements.

Here Professor Malcolm sees

"

correct

language to imply not only proper usage, but also
truth , that is, being

correct is equivalent to being true.

Thus to refute any philosophical

paradox, all one need do is to indicate where there has been a
misuse of

language.

The confusion here seems to be the confounding of the terms

"proper" and "true."

Truth may be understood as that which corresponds

to a statement of fact; while propriety demands no more than the conformity
to an established usage.

Proper usage does not, on the one hand, assure

inerrancy; nor, on the other hand, does improper usage imply falsehood.

Ordinary language has not reached the reflective level nor the sophistication capable of coping with philosophical problems such as that of consciousness.

And here any deviation from "proper" (ordinary) usage need

not necessarily result in falsehood.
Despite the problems encountered in both Moore* s and Malcolm* s theories,

Ayer persisted in adhering to the conviction that philosophy is intimately,
and Indeed inextricably, linked to language.

For Ayer all meaningful

philosophical statements were dfinitions, and definition here means none

"
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other than -definition in use."

—

As Ayer explains, «w. define a
symbol

^

by showin S how the sentences in
which it significantly occurs can
be
translated into equivalent sentences,
which contain neither the definiendnm

itself, nor any of its synonyms.

3

°And the theories which were instrumental

in bringing about this mode of translation,
which Ayer acknowledged as the
main concern of philosophy, were Russell's
theory of "definite descriptions" and his theory of "logical constructions."

Russell's theory of "definite descriptions."

Let us look briefly at

Here Russell showed how we

might meaningfully use names without postulating
the existence of the entities named.

Russell himself proposed the example "The author
of Waver lav ."

The analysis of this complex descriptive name
would be as follows:

"Some-

one (or, more strictly, something) wrote Waverlev and
nothing else wrote
^averigy;."

And the statement "The author of Waverlev is not"
could be

dealt with in a corresponding manner.

"Either each thing failed to write

or two or more things wrote Waver lev . »

Thus when Russell's

theory of "definite description" is applied, we can remove any expression
or word that purports to name any alleged entity or stand for

a thing or

substance, whose being is in question, such as "the absolute," "nothing-

ness," and other metaphysical impostors.
In his theory of "logical constructions" Russell proposed the rule that

"Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred
entities."

31
This substitution is effected when a sentence referring to any

questionable inferred entity is replaced by an acceptable equivalent whose
reference is confined to what is empirical and indubitable.

Thus the refer-

ence to any physical object would be substituted by a class of sensory data.
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Ayer, however, went beyond Russell
1„ hie applioation of the letter's
theories. Not only were material
substanoes eliminated but all entitles

beyond the reach of our acquaintance,
such as consciousness of other people,
were removed. In common language,
because we use the phrase "other
people"
as a grammatical subject to which we
attach consciousness, we frequently
take consciousness to refer to some
Intangible "thing" that exists in its
own right.

And because, according to both Russell
and Ayer, consciousness

of other people's minds does not and
cannot refer to anything, it has out-

lived Its usefulness and must now retire
Into the metaphysical menagerie.
Like Moore's and Malcolm's theories, this
too must be abandoned, for none

of these theories can accommodate any theory
of consciousness.
Row we turn to the later linguistic philosophers,
generally known as
the Oxonian "ordinary language" philosophers.

Our present discussion will

be confined to the exposition and criticism of one of
the most respected
exponents of this group, namely, Professor Ryle.

According to Professor Ryle, ordinary language is riddled with
confusions which in turn produce perplexing philosophical problems.

And reveal-

ing this sort of confusion is to shed light on the nature of the problems
and their solutions.
terras

This sort of confusion that language induces Ryle

"category mistakes, n which in

the work of another.
factor."

sura

amounts to making one category do

A category mistake occurs when we misuse a "sentence

A sentence factor is "any partial expression which can enter into
33

sentences otherwise dissimilar." '"Thus in the sentence »I am the man who

wrote this papei;* *1,* *the man who,

1

*who wrote this paper,*

*wrote this

paper* are all sentence factors ."-^Let us illustrate with an example:
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"time

Wan

in 4004 B.C." and "th. rain began
at four o-clock."

The aentenoe factors ..tine" and "rain" seen
to belong to the sane category,
yet
if this were the ease then it is obvious
that we are oonfusing ^jne and an
avent in tine, as tine itself oan
never be an event in tine. In the
nanner
in which Ryle chose to define sentence
factor he would have to admit an

indefinite number of sentence factors and
in turn an indefinite number of
categories, and this he did.
Our question here is whether this
doctrine nullifies all theories of

consciousness; that is. do sentences that
purport to speak of consciousness

entail a "category mistake" of the kind described
by Ryle?

Does the belief

that there are other consciousnesses similar
to my own entail category

mistakes?

Are we here misusing the sentence factor
"consciousness"?

Clearly not!

Ihen a speculative philosopher assures us
that consciousness

is of a different "material" than. say. the objects
of consciousness, or

that there is an

Efeo

which interprets, organizes, and unifies different

contents of consciousness, one wonders if he is making a
"category mistake"

or if these problems could be resolved by simply admitting to such
mistakes.
If a philosopher is clear and consistent in articulating his concept
of

consciousness, the ultimate court of appeal would seem to be that of reason

rather than whether it entails any "category mistakes."

Undeniably specious

linguistic resemblances have led to many purely intellectual puzzles, but

we must resolve these problems, not dissolve them.

And whether the human

consciousness can be synthesized with the object of consciousness is, to
me at least, certainly a genuine and fascinating philosophical problem; and

if we approach such a problem methodically, systematically, consistently.
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and rationally, we can avoid confounding
the use of terms which is not so
much the result of language as it is

a

consequence of confused reasoning.

The oewildering absurdities that are
imposed on the philosopher appear

to be not so much a consequence of language but
rather the result of un-

clear thought.

Expressions and sentences by themselves are neither
absurd

nor true or false.

Only as interpreted are they true, false, or absurd.

If I say nobody came, and interpreted this to
mean that nobody has that

sort of attribute that enables it to come and go. then
undeniably this

expression is absurd.

But the absurdity lies in the interpretation and

not in the expression itself.

It is undeniable that we are often misled

by words in the ways Ryle has described, but the underlying source of
confusion is to be found in thought.

The discussion of words is at best

prefatory and preparatory for the resolution of such confusions.

Our

ultimate appeal must be to an analysis of thought, consciousness, and mind.

We have reviewed, the basic tenents of the logical positivists and the
earlier and later linguistic analysts.

Their austere speculative asceti-

cism, their stern self-exactions, their requirement of rigor of statement,

their demand for olarity, and their insistence on fidelity to fact are
indeed admirable.

However, it is very disconcerting to see the positivists,

on the one hand, restricting philosophy to meaning-inspection at the price

of total neglect of the more important and interesting philosophical
problems; and the linguistic analysts, on the other, limiting their investi-

gations to the sphere of language, again at the cost of forsaking the peren-

nial problems of philosophy.

Not only are the interests of the analytical

philosophers not channeled in the direction of a study of consciousness,

•
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but their very methodology prevents them
from theorizing about the human
consciousness
Logical positivism is guided by the desire
to inspect the contents of

consciousness rather than consciousness itself.

And its distaste for all

forms of speculative philosophy imposes on
it the conviction that the
subjective aspect of consciousness is unworthy
of serious attention.

The

logical positivists are only interested in the
objective elements of consciousness, namely, the objects or, more accurately,
the contents of consciousness.

Thus any speculation on the pure form of consciousness
is

regarded as nothing more than verbal waste.

Any philosophy which purports to analyze nonperceptible
actualities
must to that degree be speculative; this seems to be the unavoidable
consequence of a basic human limitation.

But through austere rationalism we

need not be misled into obscure and incoherent speculations.

However,

some philosophical problems, among them the problem of consciousness,

cannot be expressed in a clear-cut manner; nor is ordinary, everyday lan-

guage efficacious as a tool for the articulation of such problems.

Hence

the philosopher must resort to a language which is often obscure; yet

however obscure his language, his method and his concepts need not be.

We

must now examine another mode of philosophizing which would more readily
accommodate theories of consciousness.

To this end we shall direct our

attention to phenomenology, specifically, phenomenology as Husserl understood it to mean*
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Gabillt^

a Phenomenolop-j ca l_Approach
to the Problem of

Consciousness .
" Phenomenology”

is often considered to be a profound
and recondite

approach to philosophy and science, but the
vagueness which accompanies
this term is not only misleading but empties
it of meaning.

There has

been no clear notion of the precise contributions
of phenomenology
to philosophy; but only the general conception
that any attempt to detach

philosophy from speculative constructionism and to
limit investigation to
the data which are presented in consciousness—
descriptive rather than

explicative— is phenomenological.

This much, at least, is accurate.

But

to take but one example, the popular impression that
phenomenology is inex-

tricably tied up with existentialism and that these two terms can
be used
indiscriminately is unwarranted.

The reason for this misconception is per-

haps due to the fact that Sartre* s philosophy, which is both
phenomenologioal

and existential, is frequently taken as representative of both the pheno-

menologists and the existentialists.

This is, of course, inaccurate; for

philosophers like Heidegger and Ijarcel, who consider their approaches to

be phenomenological, would gladly be disassociated from the Sartrean line.

And others like Jean Kering and Dietrich von Hildegrand would not particularly relish being called existentialists.'"
To trace the genesis of the term phenomenology we must, in the end,

make reference to Kant*s original distinction between the phenomenon or
appearance of reality in consciousness, and the noumenon . the thing-initself.

In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant proposed that scientific

knowledge concerns phenomena and not nouraena, and to this extent his

-
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critique can be considered a sort of phenomenology.

This position further

stresses that what is known is phenomena, precisely
because to know here

means to appear to consciousness in a particular way.

We can think of a

thing-in-itself" or potmen on but not know it, the known aspect
of a "thing

in-itself

,T

is the

£ufc.nor.icnop ,

i.e., its appearance .

Phenomena are all that

we have to go by; but according to Hegel, who was the first
philosopher to
designate his own philorophy as phenomenology, phenomena reveal all
that is
to be revealed through the dialectical process of human thought, and
here
is where Hegel deviated from Kant.

If we understand phenomenology to express merely a descriptive approach,

then to the extent that positivism is concerned with a descriptive mode

of philosophizing , its claim that only phenomena are given to the consciousness, and that the sole business of the philosopher is to describe

the contents of consciousness, it is phenomenological.

As Heidegger ex-

plained, the expression "descriptive phenomenology" is tautological, for

these two terms are inseparable.

And from this, what Freud and the later

behaviorlsts proposed to do in psychology, namely, to confine themselves
to description and observation of human behavior, they too are to this
degree phenomenologists .
phenomenologists .

But surely this is not the sole interest of the

Their prime concern lies with the essences (the constant

elements in a coordinated series of the actual and possible manifestations

of appearance) which are revealed through phenomena as known through consciousness.

Implied here is the dual conviction that consciousness cannot

be known independently of reality, and its converse, that reality is not
knowable apart from consciousness.

But in seeking to reveal the essence of
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phenomena described, phenomenology
is not to be confused with some
sort of
modified Kantian noumenology; the
phenomenologists are not seeking for
something ‘’behind" the phenomenon.
Throughout the history of philosophy
there has been a relentless quest
for a consistent reconciliation between
the reality of which we are conscious
and the consciousness we have of
reality. And the phenomenologists are
no exception; they are united in

their belief that only phenomena are
given, and that a reconciliation,
if it is possible, must be sought in
phenomena, that is. our consciousness
of them.

Hence, as Layer puts it. consciousness is
for the phenomenolo-

gist "a kind of being which things exercise,
the only kind of being directly

available to the investigator.

Thus, ... consciousness is best expressed

by the Berman word Bewusstsein, which means the kind
of being an object of
knowledge has in being known. "^However, not in the sense
of an identifica-

tion of being and being-known, but rather the notion that
revelation of

being can come about only through examination of its being-known.
An investigation of an act of consciousness will reveal that
(1) acts

of consciousness are related to each other in a continuum, and
(2) an act

of consciousness is never solely subjectively conditioned but must always
have an objective aspect to it, that is, it must always refer to some object of consciousness.

Because every act of consciousness is

a

complex com-

pounding of subjective and objective elements, its analysis must in turn

be a complex affair.

But the phenomenologist is confident that this analy-

sis is possible, and moreover it will lead him to the very origin of pure

consciousness, free from all a priori prejudices, and will bring him to

an understanding of the only being which can have significance for him.
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Thus an examination of the experienced
world must begin with consciousness,
for it is only through consciousness that
this world, as experienced, is

possible; consciousness becomes the very
condition of our experience.
The "objective" essences, which the
phenomenologist aims at discovering, must be independent of any arbitrary
meaning that a subject mAy feel

disposed to assign to them.

The siteject cannot, as it were, "produce" the

objects; nor. on the other hand, are the objective
essences conceived as

engendering the relationship which exists between
essence and subject,
ihis relationship, which resides in the conscious
act, is not derived from
it; it has an autonomy that renders it truly objective. 37
Henoe this objec-

tive relationship maintains the equilibrium between the two
elements, and
it can only be revealed by an investigation of pure consciousness.

And the

essences, if they are to be found, must be sought in consciousness.
ihus phenomenology is not merely a discipline which takes consciousness

as its point of departure but revolves its whole investigation around
con-

sciousness, attempting to unveil consciousness in its present form as the

very seat of all possible experience, and consequently all knowledge.
These general remarks will suffice for our present purpose.

We do not

propose to here provide an all-inclusive exposition of phenomenology, which

would invariably lead us into indissoluble conflicts, for the phenomenologists by no means agree on many issues, and, moreover, their interests and

techniques differ.

Our sole intent is to show the advantages of pheno-

menology to cope with the problem of consciousness, and how this discipline
is oriented so that it readily admits analyses of consciousness.

with a few criticisms of analytical philosophy and a few brief remarks
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on phenomenology, we now turn to the
background wherein Sartre developed
his phenomenological ontology.

The two men whose influences on Sartre

were conspicuously evident throughout Sartre’s
Being and Nothingness are
Husserl, commonly considered to be the founder
of the phenomenological

method in its present form, and Heidegger, who was
for many years an

assistant to Husserl at Freiburg.

We shall next consider some relevant

thoughts of each of these men in turn, emphasizing
the points of congruence
and divergence between these philosophers and Sartre.

Our concern will be

confined to those theories that have influenced Sartre’s method and
his

analysis of consciousness, and hopefully our discussion of those
theories

will implement our understanding of Sartre.

We do not pretend this stridy

to be exhaustive, even of those theories here considered.
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part II

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF SARTRE

A.

Husserl and the Theory of Intentionally

Phenomenology for Husserl is both a method and a
philosophy.

It is a

method in that it outlines the steps and provides
the techniques to reveal
the pure phenomenon, wherein the essence of
appearances and that which
appears are to be found; it is a philosophy in that
it purports to give nee

essary and essential knowledge of that which is.
free from all contingent
factors.

Phenomenology seeks to return to "things" as they are
described

in terms of the consciousness wherein they are experienced.

Such experi-

ence is distinguishable from other experiences, for the essence
of each

experience is clearly recognizable as different from essences of
other
experiences.
In his search for a science of essences, or an essential science,

Husserl consistently adhered to his convictions that the task of philoso-

phy is none other than an investigation of the very meaning (essence) of
being, and that this investigation must, in its own right, be just as

scientific as mathematics.

According to Husserl, this science is possible

only through the application of the phenomenological method, wherein
"things" are freed of all elements of contingency.

Thus Husserl* s philos-

ophy can be regarded as an elaboration of the method through which we can
arrive at the essential knowledge of things, or through which we can discover the what of the things that are .

Such a science cannot be a system ,

for each "thing" must be examined separately in order to determine its
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essence.

There cannot be one underlying prineiole to
which all essences

of things conform, but this is not to say that
the approach and method

cannot be

s^stemat^q .

foxjnd "in

the unity of a well-built edifice, wherein one solid
stone is

And in this resoect. unity, if it exists, must
be

placed on another,” and each stone represents an
essence which is necessary
and eternally true.

Phenomenology as a study of consciousness must ultimately examine each
act of consciousness as a "pure” act of consciousness, seeking
to discover
in each its essence,

v rom this approach Husserl arrived at
the conclusion

that consciousness must always be consciousness of (something), that is
"the essence of the Cartesian co^ito contained the co?itatum as immediately

as the coglto itself.”
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Thus an act of consciousness is inextricably linked

to its object, they are but the subjective and the objective aspects of the
same thing.

Hence, to know an act of consciousness essentially is to know

its object; and this knowledge of the object is absolute in the sense that
it is free from all vestiges of contingency, including that of existence.

Object here is not limited to things, but includes persons, thought, events,
categories, states of affairs, mental constructs such as numbers, and
others.

And each of these objects has an essence which "can be *seen*

immediately in an adequate view of the act of consciousness wherein it is
contained.”
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However, mental constructs, specifically those of mathematics

and logic, are purely the products of consciousness; they are static and

changeless and thus are independent of the conditions of the stream of

progressive experience which other objects as objects are subjected to.
Thus the flux of experience renders it impossible to describe essences,
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with the exception of those of logic and
mathematics, to any degree of
exactitude, for by such a description we
would immobilize the flow of consciousness.

Essences , again with the exception of those
of logic and mathe-

matics, if they are described exactly, become
static.

And since, as

kusserl admitted, we must allow a certain
latitude in the conception of

what essences are, the description of these need
not be exact.
For nusserl, to grasp the essence of something
is to grasp its meaning.
In this regard essence and ’’sense” are identical, and
since sense, or the

signification of things, is not to be found in a contingent
world of things
existing independently of consciousness, it follows that we
must seek
essenoes of things in consciousness itself.

But to speak of essence is to

speak of that which is absolutely necessary, and since Kusserl defines
the

necessary as that which has been purified of all contingency, then a science
of essence is nothing more than this purification which can be accomplished

only in consciousness; and this is the precise reason why Husserl confines
his investigation to consciousness and attempts to purify consciousness.
In his attempt to accomplish this purification of the consciousness,

Husserl developed his singularly most important concept, the concept of
intentionality.
is to intend

mind.

(

In his analysis of meanings Husserl concluded that to mean

meinen )

.

and thus a meaning

(

meinung ) is an intention of the

And intentionality refers to both the relationship between mind and

some extra-mental reality and the objective term of the mind’s operation in

this reality, wherein is found the very essence of being itself.

Thus

essence, sense, and meaning, which are to be found in consciousness, are

nothing but intentions, and these are joined through the common bond of
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intentional! ty.

The vorld of consciousness becomes
the world of intentions.

But intentions as mere intentions are
empty-only when this intention is
Justified, is it fulfilled. To fulfill an
Intention requires more than
the meaning which the mind assigns
in thinldng-it requires an experience

of that which the mind signifies in thought.

A genuine intention must

signify some characteristic of the actual state
of affairs i that is. it

must have some objective reference, and this
is the Justification it needs
to b© a full Intention rather than an empty
intention.

In his pursuit of the essence of consciousness
Husserl came to the

conclusion that consciousness is always in the form of
"consciousnese-of"
something ; that is, consciousness must always be oriented
towards an object, and this orientation is its very intentional!
ty, which is to be found

in an analysis of consciousness itself.

Thus all acts of consciousness

must entail both subjectivity and objectivity.

And true reflection is

inseparable from the object of reflection, for reflection is but an
erlebnis
(vital experience) of the latter, and, similarly, to reflect on one f s
own

consciousness is to have an erlebnis of it.

From this, to be aware of

one*s own consciousness as objectively orievted is to have an "intentional

erlebnis ."

When Husserl characterized his philosophy as a "science of essences,"
two theses are implied:

first, the objects of this science are independent

of mental construction; and secondly, the essences known are independent
of their correspondence to reality outside the consciousness.

Thus we can

arrive at the essences only after we have purified both the consciousness
and the objects of consciousness of all accidental and contingent elements.
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consequently, Husserl developed the
techniques necessary to assure pure
phenomenality of all objects of investigation.
His first and more fundamental technique aimed at removing all
factual roots of objects of investigation. for according to Husserl, existence
is contingent and is a prime

source of doubt.

This technique he calls the epoohe . and
it aims at the

radical and universal elimination of all
positions that commit one to any

position regarding factual existence.

By this Husserl did not intend to

eliminate existence itself but merely to remain
noncommittal, to leave
this question out of consideration, and simply
not enter into the question
of what things are.

"Existence,” or as Husserl frequently called it,

"transcendence, is simply bracketed

(*put

in parentheses*) in the sense that

in its regard no position is taken either for or against—
it may be that

things exist outside oonsoiousness , but since this
existence can have no

significance whatever with regard to the essence of things, it is
simply
left out of consideration. "^The epoohe is conceived as that
which elimi-

nates the contingent question of existence and, in turn, eliminates the

doubt it entails.

Throughout the phenomenological journey this question

cannot be reintroduced , lest doubt should be reintroduced, thus bringing

back the impure elements that are not necessary and, therefore, not essential.

filter.

This technique is, of course, a negative device which serves as a

But the epoohe must have a positive counterpart which will pene-

trate into the essential residue, thus gradually revealing the pure sub-

jectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity.

And this is to be

found in the various levels of reduction.
There are, according to Lauer,

six recognizable levels of reduction to
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be found in Husserl* s writings, and each
reduction brings a greater purity
of the subject. Furthermore, only when
subjectivity is at its purest can
it be the universal a priori source of
objectivity.
The first stage of reduction, psychological
reduction, aims at idealiz-

ing the phenomenon of consciousness in that
it seeks to disengage the

essence of consciousness from all its factual
concretization and thus to
"escape the relativism inherent in the multiplicity
of contingent subjects . 43
The second reduction, eidetic reduction, seeks to
idealize objectivity

while purifying subjectivity.

Here the essence of consciousness is seen

to be consciousness-of something.

If the first reduction is regarded as

the purification of the cogito . then the second reduction can be
viewed as
the purification of the cogitatum .
The remaining reductions seem less clear, for they are not so much

distinct stages within a reductive process but rather concomitant factors

within a framework of purification.
as the "phenomenological reduction."

The first of these can be referred to

Here we must conceive awareness as

that which in no way objectifies that of which it is an awareness, that is,
to regard a subject which is in no sense of the word objectified

"pure" subject.

following manner:

,

hence a

Lauer explicates this rather difficult notion in the
"We might understand it as a way of grasping objects:

in every intentional act an object is that of which consciousness is con-

sciousness.

There can, then, be no consciousness-of a pure subject; that

would be to objectify it and thus make it cease to be *pure.*
*

Still,

object* is an essentially relative term; there can be no object which is

not object for a subject.

Hence, if an object is genuinely given as object,
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it is given as object for a subject, and thus the
subject, too, is given;
it is a datum of consciousness.

Just as there is no consciousness (act of

consciousness) without its objective reference, so there can be
no object

without its subjective reference.

So long as the term of this reference

is not objectified, it is *pure subject.'" 44 "]* then,
there is a subject

which is in no way an objeot, it is a subject of which we cannot be conscious in the strict sense of the term, since the very preposition 'of*

would indicate in it an objective relationship.

And still we must say of

this subject that it is known; in fact, it is the first absolute certitude.
It is known and it is known In consciousness, but it is not known as that

£f which one is conscious; it is simply known as that which is conscious,
which is to say, as the subjective term of the act of consciousness,
corresponding to the pure grammatical subject of the cogito.

If the sub-

ject is at all conscious of being conscious it is conscious of itself as
Jut

subject."

But this subject can be regarded as an object of reflection,

and in so doing we arrive at the knowledge of its essence—and this is pure
subjectivity.

But this is possible only through a further reduction, that

is, if we universalize the subject attained through the phenomenological

reduction by objectifying it.

From this it is clear that by a further

reduction we can arrive at a pure transcendental ego, wherein an identification of essential knowledge and objective knowledge can be attained.

From this identification it follows that to know the transcendental ego is
to know objectivity.

Then the transcendental ego must be the a priori

source of all objectivity.
It would seem that with the transcendental ego we would have arrived at
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the fin.1 term whereby no further
reduction is possible.

But according to

Husserl, the successive flow of
experiences does not allow this subject
to
remain static, for to become static
is to cease to be subjectivity.
Thus
there is a final reduction which
terminates in the last term, namely, a

"pure flow of consciousness." which
realises the temporality of oonsoiousness.

lm P leraent th ® reductions in assuring
the penetration of the residue
Ci

pnen °mena left after the

ff£.PP h e

the technique called ideation.

to their very essence, Husserl developed

This technique consists in submitting the

original perception or imagination to a series
of ’’free” variation, wherein
the object is viewed from various aspects.

And after a few aspects the con-

stant element will be "seen,” and this is precisely
the essence of the objeot.

We need not labor through the infinite variety of
possible and actual

aspects—a few aspects suffice to bring out the essence.

This technique

has the advantage in securing the objective validity
of the knowledge

resulting from the process.

have universal validity.
of essential intuition.

But what is necessary for one subject need not

Thus Kusserl develops a fourth technique, that
Here the essence of things, events, processes,

intuitions, are simply "seen."

But for this intuition to be definitive, it

is not sufficient that one subject "sees" the essence involved.

Husserl

asserts that all subjects must "see" it in a similar way if they are reasonable.

We have indicated some main features of Husserl's methodology, his goal,

his theory of intentional! ty, and his basic phenomenological techniques, and

we are now prepared to examine some of Heidegger's theories.

39
B.

Helde^er and Hjs Phenomenology of the Daseln
Strictly speaking, we cannot justifiably
maintain that Heidegger’s

analysis of ’’human Dasein” has any direct
bearing on Sartre’s theory of
consciousness, for Heidegger avoids appeal to
consciousness in his descrip-

tion of ’’human Dasein” characterized as
”3eing-in-the-world."

But there

is constraining evidence that Heidegger’s
conception of ’’Nothingness” has

brought Sartre closer to his own notion of ’’nothingness,”
and, moreover,
we can detect many points where the thoughts of the
two men converge.

Like

Heidegger, Sartre abolishes Husserl’s reductions, for both
these philoso-

phers are concerned with the solution of ’’Being” based
on a phenomenolo-

gical ontology; their focus of attention is on the very existence
of ”Reing”

facing the world which Husserl discards.

We also find traces of Heidegger

in -artre’s analyses of facticity and contingency, of potentiality
and

instrumentality, of anguish, and of authenticity and inauthenticity.

But

nowhere is Heidegger’s influence more conspicuous than in Sartre’s notion

of time.

Here dartre almost replicates Heidegger’s conception, with the

exception of perhaps the idea and the explanation of present .

In the brief

exposition that we shall now attempt we will confine ourselves to Heidegger’s

major work, his Being and Time , published in 192?.

This work, which Sartre

was obviously familiar with prior to writing his own magnum opus , exerted

considerable influence on Sartre’s thinking.
The perennial question which Heidegger asks in his Being and Time is:
’’What is the

Being of the things-that are?”^And his original project was

to answer this question by providing threee sections on interpreting the

Dasein as temporality.

Of these proposed sections only the first two
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reached the cress.

The first section was entitled
«A Preparatory Funda-

mental Analysis of Dasein."

Here Heidegger sought to provide,
through

phenomenological analysis, a methodical
exposition of the -fundamental

reality of existence:

a temporal horizon within
which the things

’in the

world’ come to have meaning and hence
come ’to be* in tirae" 48 The second
section. "Dasein and Temporality.” sought
to carry this theme forward by

"showing how the Dasein, in projecting the
world’s horizon, founds
history.
wf the first section our sole hope i3 to
explicate the aspects of

Dasein as they converge toward the fundamental
structure of the Being of
the Dasein as Care (Do.rge).

According to Heidegger, any solution to the

question "What is the Being of the things-that-are?"
must begin by a pehnomenological analysis of the Casein's -standing-in"

(

Instandlgkeit ^ in the

world, which will reveal the fundamental relationship of
the Dasein to the

things-that-are.
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And to understand Casein’s "standing-in" is to examine

the phenomenon of human concern
in

1

(

Besorgen ) for things, for this "standing-

is not so much a spatial phenomenon as it is essentially a human rela-

tionship to things as "utensils," that is, the instrumentality of things.

And it is furthermore a human relationship of concern, of intention, of
meaning and knowledge.
of Dasein.

Thus the world is possible only through the "concern"

Here "world" clearly does not refer to the world of things; it

is the world of the Xch

(

mv world).

that makes meaning possible?

But what is the structure of the Dasein

In this context Heidegger sees three aspects

of the Dasein which engender this relationship of world-projecting concern
to the things-that-are.

The two modes of this structure are the eleentlich .

«
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(authentic mode), and the jffie^en^l^ck
(inauthentic) mode.

In the authentic mod© of standing-in the Dasein relates
himself to things "in view of
the whole structure of what he really
51
is." Whereas in the inauthentic mode,

the Dasein is distracted by the petty
necessities of everyday life and loses
sight of the full structure of his possibilities.
are:

The authentic aspects

realization of self as already cast into the
world, facticity
^vy^hkoit^ )

guage (Egde).

;

understanding (Verstehen): and speech, discourse
or lan-

The inauthentic aspects are:

curiosity (^sty^ey); and prattle

(

Gerede ).

ambiguity

(

Zweideutikeit

'l

The aspects of each mode are

inseparable, for they are constituents of the basic
act of standing-in.
The authentic mode of Dasein »s standing-in, if examined,
will reveal

that the fundamental concern (Resorgen) of Dasein involves a
self-extension
projecting toward what is unknown and £s not yet, so that being and
meaning

may be instilled in the things-that-are, always in view of the fundamental
possibility that lies with the Dasein alone.

But before we analyse the

fundamental ontological structure which underlies, unifies, and

mkes

possible the aspects of the authentic mode, we must first examine the pos-

sibility of inauthenticity, for it is within this context that authenticity

becomes meaningful, again because authenticity is in part the realiza-

tion of Dasein* s forfeiture of his fundamental possibility.
The inauthentic aspects of standing-in are just as positive as the

authentic aspects; that is, ontologically speaking they are on the same
footing; together they form the two facets of the Dasein* s finltude.
Dasein, insofar as he is finite, is cast into

a

The

world whose very condition

seems to be those trivial necessities of daily life, which take the form
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of "they" in Heideggerian language.
i.-asein"

This condition of the "every day

is the forfeiture (Verfallensein) of Dasein *s
fundamental possi-

bility, that is, "not-being-itself" which is a genuine and
positive possi-

bility of Dasein.

This condition of Dasein finds roots in the finitude of

Dasein, which renders impossible a pure revelation of Being in a
perfect

relationship to the things-that-are.

Thus authentic existence must remain

as a directional ideal toward which Dasein strives in his attempt
to extricate himself from the inessential.

The consequence of this is that man

exists in a state of impure j.>efindllchkeit
-4weideut jg lceit (ambiguity).

understanding

(

.

whioh is what Heidegger calls

This state imposes upon the aspect of genuine

^erstehen ) an impure element of curiosity

(

Keugier )

•

These

two aspeots, understanding and curiosity, are referred to as "originative

thinking" and "caleulative thinking" in Heidegger* s later works.

Under-

standing reveals meaning of things whereupon it is exercised in a new
light; whereas curiosity or "caleulative thinking" merely recapitulates

the preconceived, the preconditioned and established meaning of things

imposed by the "they."

In curiosity no new horizon of meaning is ever

invented.
The opposition between understanding and curiosity leads us to the third

Here we have the distinction between the inauthentic aspect,

aspect.

prattle

(

Gerede ) and its authentic aspect, discourse (Rede).

Here under-

standing is permeated by prattle and thus becomes curiosity rather than

genuine understanding, whose expression can come about only through genuine discourse.
Our next step is to examine the necessary and fundamental structure of
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Dasein's essential possibility, which
underlies and unifies the aspects

which we have thus far discussed.

What we seek here is an ultimate form

of concern which covers the entire realm
of things that can enter the horizon of the world of meaning. This form
of concern touches the meaning of

all things-that-are.

What is involved here is nothing short
of the very

questioning of the horizon of meaning itself.
attitude as 3o£^e.

Heidegger characterizes this

The approximate English translation of this
term is to

be found in the term "care."

Here, in the stAte of Sorge (care), Dasein

confronts his fundamental possibility.

The Dasein realizes "his own

reality as projection of the world horizon and, at
the same time, as radiCO

cal finitude.’’

tie

is both the very source of all meaning in the world

and nothingness as finite being.

Thus this revelation puts Dasein' s whole

being-in-the-world into question; this pivotal point of authentic
self-

discovery is what Heidegger terms Angst (anguish).

But anguish is oroper

to the Dasein alone, and in this state the Dasein experiences the
seeming

dissolution of the world in his recognition that he is cast into a world
whose meaning and being depend upon his meaning and interpretation of it
through genuine understanding and discourse.

Thus recognition by the Dasein

of his total responsibility for there being a "world" leads to the further

recognition that "every moment of authentic existence must unite care for
each of the three temporal extases:

the past, the present, and the
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future"— "the past which Dasein must assimilate as part of the authentic

Defindlichlelt « the future which Dasein builds out through the projections
of

V erstehen

(understanding), and the present of that dwelling with the

things-that-are that takes place in the Rede (discourse) which expresses

6

%
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his grasp of things. "^However, this
recognition is possible only when

Dasem

has reached the extreme precipice of
inauthenticity, where he flees

the realities of his finite existenoe.

And through Argst (anguish) the

caring Dasein discovers the very nature of that
dynamic, finite structural

whole which is his existenoe.

Thus in gorge (care), and through Angst

(anguish). "Heidegger has sought to unify the three
modes in an expression

which underscores the characteristic temporality
of each.

In Sorge . he

says, Dasein discovers himself as Sich
-vorweg-im-sohon-sein-ln-einer1 “k? n- Be^ (oglenden)

,

i.e., as self-projecting Being (expressing the

futurity of the projection' in Verstehen

)

that is already in a world (express^

ing the past nature of Befindlichkeit ) as being in company with the
things-

that-are (which expresses the essential present act of coming to dwell with
the Sejenden discursive, temporal fruition that is Rede)

."^ith

the dis „

covery of the dynamic structure underlying the three modes of standing-in,
Heidegger must now turn to the inner ontological nature of the discovered

structure— its nature as temporality.
We have seen how Heidegger expresses the essence of Dasein as his freedom to project himself in time beyond the here and now toward the future
that is not yet (noch nicht).

And because the Dasein, in grasping the

fullness of his whole structure, reveals to himself at once his fundamental

possibility and his finitude, he must understand this in terms of his ultimate end or limit.

The cognizance of this absolute limitation is rooted

in his awareness of his Being-toward-death

(

Seln-zum-Tode ) .

Only within

this context does the Dasein* s "very possibility to be" become meaningful.
Thus every moment, every act, and every event must be viewed within the
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haunting awareness of death, and furthermore
eaoh moment and each act
comes to a terminal dissolution.

The freedom to project, to develop his

essence, endowed on every Dasein, must be viewed
in light of the limits

imposed on the Dasein by his essential finitude.

And when Dasein accepts

his essence as a Being-toward-death, all external
influences and events

lose their overriding importance.
ness

^

g he it

)

When the Dasein confronts this Nothing-

of his own Being, all mundane events are seen from the

only authentic perspective.

Thus Heidegger writes, "In anguishing the

Dasein discovers himself by the Nothingness of the possible
impossibility
of his existence. "-^The Dasein realizes that his ultimate possibility is
death, that is, the impossibility of his existing forever.

The Nothingness

of Dasein is the Nothingness of Being, which is to say that the Dasein

recognizes Nothingness as his ultimate end; the Dasein is but might not
he is finite as a Being-toward-death.

be—

And this grasping, willing, and

accepting the reality of his own Nothingness, which is imposed on him by
his radical finitude, is the very condition of his freedom.
The existential-ontological unity of the three aspects of standing-in
is, according to Heidegger, a temporal unity.

lng-in there corresponds a mode of temporality.

Thus to each aspect of stand-

And our next

3 teo

is to
I

examine each aspect of standing-in corresponding to a mode of temporality.
(1) The future.

It is precisely because the Dasein* s structure enables him to project

forward toward his possibilities that he can anticipate them and be present
to them now, which in a sense brings the Dasein* s future to the now-here.

And insofar as the fundamental possibility of the Being of Dasein is
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pointed toward the future, this futurity must
in some manner guide the
Casein's whole self-development.

Thus Heidegger concludes:

tal extasis of the Dasein is the future.

Q er stgfren

;

is grounded in the futurity of

The fundamen-

For Heidegger all understanding

Meeting

toward possibilities,

to have an authentic understanding, the Dasein
must always project

i’hen

toward his future.
(2) The Past.

Again in projecting toward the future of possibilities the Dasein
must
recapture his past.

And to this extent the Dasein brings the past into the

realm of the here-now.
fundamental position
past.

But in so doing the Dasein must be aware of his

— Defindlichkeit

(facticity)—which is rooted in the

The past, as it were, is given, and the existence of the Dasein is

"turned” by what has come before.

Thus future projection must take into

account the past.
(3) The present.

The fundamental projection of the Dasein toward the possibilities of the

future involves bringing the future and the past to the

present.

Here the

Dasein is in the creative process of making-present of what is present.
But the grasp of the present can only be expressed in genuine discourse
(

Rede )

.

Hence, in this manner Heidegger has at once unified the three as-

pects of authentic standing-in in time (it is well to mention here that

Heidegger likewise unified the three inauthentic aspects of standing-in,

which are inseparable from the authentic aspects.

Unfortunately, we have

neither the time nor space to deal with this portion of Heidegger's
and lime and the three modes of temporality.

Dein;:

ky

1th Husserl and Heideeger behind
dartre’s theory of consciousness.

us. we are now prepared to analyte

“

THE HIATUS BETWEEN THE "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" AND
"BEINO-IN-ITS ELF

A.

Sartre *s Point of Departure
In Sartre »s major philosophical work, Being and Nothingness
,
we find

the subtitle “An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology."

In this subtitle

Sartre indicates his method and point of departure to his solution
of the

problem of Being.

And the title of his work seems to suggest the two re-

gions of Being which he proposes to consider, namely. Being (Deing-in-

itself , 1 « etre-en-soi ) and Nothingness (Baing-for-itself , Vetre-rour-soi ).

Any interpretive analysis which purports to explicate the basic principles
underlying Sartre »s solution of the problem of Being will do well to first

clarify this particular phrase “phenomenological ontology. “
“phenomenological ontology*’ mean for Sartre?

What does

The answer to this question

will be found in the important Introduction with which Sartre prefaces his
Being and Nothingness .

In these introductory pages Sartre traces the development of the concept of the “phenomenon” back to the founder of the "phenomenological”
method, Edmund Husserl.

For the phenomenologists the existent as “pheno-

menon” is limited to a series of appearances which manifest it; these appearances are neither exterior nor interior to the object under consideration.

They, in effect, reject the notion of the reality of a “Being-in-

itself” which lies concealed behind a series of appearances.

On this point,

Sartre, remaining faithful to his claim of being a realist, however, deviating

from phenomenology, posits a transphenomena 1 being which, as it were, "overflows” its appearances.

We shall elaborate on this notion later on, for
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the present suffice to say that this
notion will present considerable

difficulties for Sartre as he attempts to reconcile
his postulation of a
"transphenomenal being" (being-in-itself and his
)
position as a phenomenologist.
detail.

In our criticism we will deal with this problem
in greater

The phenomenologists . furthermore, assert that
appearances as

such are all the

same— they refer to one another yet none of them stands

in a more priveleged position in our consciousness.

With this attempt the

phenomenologists hoped to have abolished the traditional dualisms
(that
have obstructed the path of the philosopher since the
time of Descartes)

by means of the monism of the phenomenon.

One such dualism is the cleavage

between "interiority" and "exteriority"; that is, the notion that the real-

ity of a 'Being-in-itself" lies "behind" the "series of appearances" which
manifest it.

This particular dualism Nietzsche characterized as "the illu-

sion of hidden worlds."

The effort on the part of the phenomenologists,

if successful, will obviously obviate Kant*s distinction between the
"phenomenon" and the

•

thing -in-it self."

In this light the phenomenologists

(Husserl and others ) Regard the "phenomenon" as relative insofar as it pre-

supposes someone to whom it is revealed, and absolute insofar as it reveals

itself as it is and as absolutely indicative of itself referring to nothing
but itself; hence, it is a relative-absolute. ^In this phenomenological
framework the distinction between "essence" and "appearance" can no longer
be maintained— the phenomenon must reveal at once both essence and appearance
of the object considered.

"The essence of an existent is no longer a property

sunk in the cavity of this existent, it is the manifest law which presides
over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of this series

"

"
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....But essence, as the principle of the series,
is definitely only the concatenation of appearance; that is, itself an
9
appearance.*?

Although by reducing the existent to its
manifestations we have eliminated many dualisms, yet one still remains
to plague the philosopher.

No

matter how numerous the instances of appearance,
they can never exhaust
the infinite number of possible appearances
whioh the object to be identi-

fied can manifest.

Thus, since only a few appearances, or even one,
often

suffice in revealing the identity of an object, say a
table, this single

appearance must be related or linked to the whole series
of possible appearances which the observer may not or cannot perceive
in such

a

manner as

to permit it, in some way, to have "a transcendent or
transphenomena 1

reference insofar as it refers to other phenomenal aspects which are
not

given in this particular intuition." 60 (This is clearly reminiscent of
Husserl’s concept of "ideation").

The opposition is no longer that of

"appearance" versus "being"; rather it is replaced by that of the finite

and the infinite or, better still, "the infinite in the finite , 6lthat is,
the problem of "relating the single appearance which ^s now to the ap-

pearances whioh it is not but to which it is indissolubly linked. 62 0ur

immediate problem then is to clarify the "being of this appearing."
In considering this problem, if the appearance is examined from the

context of its appearing, then our concern must at the same time include

the description of its concrete manifestations, for we are here assuming
that that which manifests itself really

jjs.

But in affirming that that

whioh manifests itself (the object) really ^s, we are saying that one instance of its appearing (one single appearance) does not and cannot provide
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the whole series of possible appearances,
yet by the very fact that this

single instance of appearing is possible
implies that the object already,

in some sense, exists.

Thus at any moment the '’being" of that which

appears always "overflows" the given appearances
that the individual observer may perceive.

And in this light Sartre distinguishes the "being
of

phenomenon" from the "phenomenon of being." which are,
for him, inseparable
since the latter, insofar as it has transphenomenal
reference, must refer
63
to the former. And the function of "phenomenological ontology" is
pre-

cisely to clarify the relation between these two aspects.

Sartre calls it

ontology because, for him, appearance really is, "appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being"; 64
and it is phenomenological in the sense that "being" is inextricably
linked to the concrete manifestations of those appearances which, as it
were, always posit a consciousness to appear to.

(Strictly speaking,

Sartre’s phenomenological method does not follow rigidly Husserl’s method.
We shall olarify this point in our criticism.)

This appearing to con-

sciousness is the phenomenon’s "being for a consciousness."

Just as the

phenomenon presupposes a consciousness, consciousness must also always be
consciousness of something; that is, every act of consciousness posits a
"transcendent" object (or "content") outside itself.

Consciousness is

always in the form of consciousness-of ; it is invariably objectively
oriented.

world.

65
Consciousness, therefore, is positional consciousness of the

Thus consciousness, to the extent that one conceives it as "know-

ing," this "knowing" is nothing other than knowledge of an object.

Implicit

in this idea that a knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its

s
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object is the idea of a consciousness
which is conscious of itself as consciousness. From this Sartre asserts
that whenever I ara conscious of an
object. J am at the same time conscious
that I am conscious of the object,
and moreover this consciousness does
not reflect on the positional consciousness as its object, indeed it is
"pre-ref lective" :

Positional con-

sciousness and self-consciousness appear
concomitantly, that is. as soon
as positional consciousness appears,
self-consciousness is there.

For

otherwise I may find myself trapped in an
infinite regress, i.e.. I may

be led to postulate the idea of a consciousness
which is conscious of

itself as a consciousness which is consciousness
iuffi.

and so cn ad infini-

. • .

It need not concern Sartre that one may not have
knowledge of this

self-consciousness, for he is concerned here sclely with what
is known and
not with how things are known.

We should also remember that Sartre*

prime preoccupation is ontology and not epistemology.

This primary self-

consciousness, unlike consciousness which necessarily posits an object,
does not posit its own consciousness as an object.

Sartre seems to sug-

gest here that all positional consciousness implies the necessity of a
non-positional consoiousness, and concludes that all positional consciousness of an object is at the same time non— positional consciousness
(of) self.

(The "of" is bracketed to show that its function ia purely

grammatical.)

And this primary consciousness Sartre calls the "pre-reflec-

tiv© cogjto ." differentiating it from the Cartesian cofrito . as well as the
authentic mode of reflection; this latter concept we shall discuss later.
It was in criticizing the Cartesian ooglto that Sartre came upon the

notion of the pre-reflective ooeito .

For Sartre this primary ("immediate"

”
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or ’’spontaneous”

)

consciousness (of) self not only precedes
but conditions

the Cartesian co^ito, for self-consciousness
must not be considered

»’a

new consciousness but as the only mode of
existence which is possible for
a consciousness of something. 66
It is a region of being involving a pure
"translucenee" prior to all knowledge.

To clarify this notion of immediate

consciousness, Sartre provides the example of pleasure. 6?
Aooording to
him, pleasure and consciousness (of) pleasure are
logically indistinguish-

able.

"Consciousness (of) pleasure is constitutive of pleasure as
the very

mode of its own existence, of the material of which
it is made, and not
as a form which is imposed by a blow upon a hedonistic
material.

Plea-

sure cannot exist 'before* the consciousness (of) pleasure. "^The immedi-

ate consciousness (of) pleasure is not a representation, it is a
"concrete
event, full and absolute, "^"it is a plenitude of exi 3 tenee,"^\ nonsub-

stantial absolute, a pure "appearance" existing only as it appears.

Yet,

this appearance itself is a form of being.
Thus far in his analysis Sartre hopes to have established three main
points:

(1) things are reduced to their concrete manifestations, namely,

the entire series of their appearances (this entails nothing short of a

complete revision of the problem of the "phenomenon"); (2) these appearances are not merely subjective appearances (thus raising the problem of

the "being of the phenomenon"); (3) and since these appearances are present
to the consciousness, a further problem must be confronted, and that is to

determine the nature or being of this perceiving subject, that is, the
perclpiens which is revealed through consciousness (this in turn leads to
the question of the pre-reflective ooerlto ).

From this Sartre feels he has
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provided an adequate basis for both knowledge and
self-consciousness.
The next question which Sartre must ask is:

"Is the 'transphenomenal*

actually the being which the phenomenon of being
refers?" To phrase

beiri

it differently, "Is consciousness sufficient to
provide the foundation for

the appearance qua appearance ?» 72 fo answer
this question we must first

recognize the fact that just as there must be a being of
the pereioi
(perceived thing), there must also be a being of the percipjens
(perceiving

consciousness), lest we fall into the solipsistic position of having
to

identify the object with the consciousness of the object, whereby the
object as such would simply vanish.

The being of the known must be dis-

tinct from the being of the lcnower .

But insofar as the phenomenon must

always appear to and for a consciousness

(

percipjens )

time be the manifestations of the object

(

percipi ) as appearing, it seems

that the being

(

.

and must at the same

esse ) of the phenomenon resides in neither the percipi

nor the percipjens

.

but rather demands both for its being.

We have seen that the notion of the "intentions lity"
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demands that con-

sciousness must always be conscious of something other than itself.

Thus,

in every act of consciousness there must be a "transcendental" constituent.
Hence, the problem of being cannot be found in a concept of consciousness

alone.

Consciousness (of) self, we concluded, is non-positional; that is,

it does not posit itself as an object, and moreover, it is revealed through

reference to positional consciousness which is always object oriented,

which is to say, positional consciousness emerges as not- self . for it
invariably refers to the other- than-self.

This transphenomenal reference

or not- self cannot be detached from its "appearances" as phenomenon.

And

,
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the revelation of the transphenomenal
beina
^ • belng-other-than-eonseiousness
is possible only because it exists,
in some

sciousness of it. ?4Thus Sartre

nr

1

/.

other than itself," 7 W'The transphenonenal
being of what exists for con-

aaawa,s

e3dsts

it§2l£-”
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Then the existent which is revealed as
appear-

ance to consciousness amst have its

mm

being, for its appearing to conscious-

ness is possible only because it rests
on the foundation of its own being. 77

Were it otherwise, the existent would dissolve
in consciousness and would not
be able to appear to consciousness as somethin*
other than consciousness.

As

consciousness directs itself toward an oblect, it
"transcends" the existent as

merely "ontic" phenomenon, that is, the consciousness
"transcends" the existent
as merely appearing toward the existent as an
intelligible object.

This means

precisely that consciousness in transcending the ontic asnect
of the existent
captures the geanfe or sense of the transphenomenal being.

Here again ve see

how the phenomenon of being and the transphenomenal being are
inextricably related.

From this we can conclude that the phenomenon of Being is founded
on

Being, and the phenomenon of Being is Being only insofar as it is revealed
to

consciousness. At this point we must make a preliminary distinction between
Being as transphenomenal being and the being of consciousness.

In the later

chapters Sartre refers to the being of consciousness as "Being-for-itself"
78

(

1

(

1 1 etre- en-soj ) of the Dhenomenon.

T

etre-pour- sol )

in contrast and opposition to the "Being-in-itself"
Clearly, that this is possible for Sartre is

the consequence of his notion of consciousness as that which emerges as other-than-the-
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being-of-the-phenomenon which is revealed as appearing
to consciousness.
Here we see. in embryo. Sartre’s original and
possibly his most important
theory, namely, the opposition between
Being-for-itself and Being-in-

itself which is engendered through the innermost
constitution peculiar to
consciousness alone.

In other words, consciousness always emerges
only

as a form of being which is
£21 the transphenomenal being.

This opposi-

tion and tension will be kept alive throughout the entire
six hundred and

fifty-two pages of his Bgjnft

Nothingness .

And it is indeed Sartre’s

primary concern to show that the Being-for-itself continually
strives for

an unattainable synthesis with the Being-in-itself and furthermore,
,
it
is because the Being-for-itself can detach itself from Being-in-itself.

thus generating a hiatus, that Being-for-itself can come into a meaningful

relationship with Being-in-itself.
In the concluding pages of his Introduction Sartre provides a brief

analysis of Being-in-itself.
nor does it "create itself"

;

For him Being-in-itself is neither '’created"
it is neither passive nor active; neither

affirmative nor negative; it simply is .

"It is an immanence which cannot

be made real, an affirmation which cannot be affirmed, an activity which
cannot aot, because it is clogged
4jl

itself

i

(

emnate ) in itself ."

79

Being simply is

it is "opaque" to itself because it is full of itself.

is what it is . it is "massive" and "full" being.

Being

Thus, Being-in-itself

is absolutely contingent, neither derivable from possibility nor reducible

to necessity; it simply is:

it is superfluous

(

de trop ).

"Uncreated,

without reason for being, without any connexion with any other being,
Being-in-itself is de trop (superfluous) for eternity .... Being is .

Being
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in itself*

Beinf?
S is

wh&t it
11 $<»
i3 * tt®0--pv
rho >-®*s°n why Sartre
characterises
,

Being-in-itaelf as radically continent
will become clear as we continue
with our exposition. Insofar a,
Being-for-itself . whloh ls nothlnj,

^

than the revelation of Being-in-itself
and Reing-in-itself wherein all
.
beins is concentrated, must be related
to Being in general, that is. they
constitute the two regions of Being,
we must examine both of these region,
of Being, let u, first turn to
Baing-for-itself. or human consciousness.
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B.

Uae Two Regions of Being
1.

For-itself

a.

The Theory and Forms of Negation.

At this point In his inquiry S.rtr.
has apparsntly rsached an Impasse.
He has so far distinguished the two modes
of 3eing S the For-itself, which
as such, is devoid of being, and
the In-itself. which is full and massive
being.

He must now establish the relation
between these two modes of

being which for him is "an original emergence
and is a part of the very
structure of these beings."
ing questions:

He must now concern himself with the follow-

(1) "What is the synthetic relation we call being-in-the-

world?"

and (2) "What must man and the world be in
order for a relation
R2
between them be possible?" The answer to these interdependent questions

must be sought in an investigation of different types
of human conduct;
consequently, Sartre begins by examining the three notions,
namely, interapjarehensiqp o£ destruction , end negative judgment .

Let us look

briefly into each.
(1)

83
Interrogation. Every question presupposes a being who questions

and a being which is questioned, and furthermore every question
pre-

supposes an ignorance on the part of the being who questions. R4This ignor-

ance is for oartre a pure "non-being" in the consciousness of the being who
questions.

But when I ask the question "Is my pencil on the table?" the

negative answer (my pencil is
"non— being . "

j

on the table) implies another form of

This Sartre describes as the "non—being of being in trans-

cendent being."

beings

rjot

Thus the question is a "bridge set up between two non-

the non-being of knowing in man, the non-being of being in trans-

cendent being." ^And finally, if the answer 4s affirmative, a third non-
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being is introduced.

The fact that I assert that the pencil
is on the

table presupposes the recognition of the
pencil if it were in fact on the
table, but this recognition is only possible
through the elimination of

what it is not.

Thus even an affirmative reply imposes this
third form

of non-being which Sartre calls the "non-being
of limitation."
(2) Apprehension of Destruction? 6 We found in
interrogation the pres-

ence of pure non-being; however, non-being is not
limited to interrogation

but is present in the prehension of the structure of destruction.
destruction of a bottle, it is reduced to pieces of glass.
tion means "change" in the presence of a human witness.

In the

Kere destruc-

This is, of course

not to suggest that there could be no destruction in the absenoe of a
human
consciousness to witness the destruction.

What it means here is that in

the strict sense, disorganization or destruction supposes organization and

which is possible only when there is a human consciousness viewing,
organizing, and ordering things.

The notion of apprehension of destruc-

tion is meaningful only when both states, prior and posterior to the event
of destruction, are known to the human consciousness.

Then in this sense

we may say that the destruction or annihilation of a form A is a form of
non-being which is possible only as it appears to a human consciousness.
(3) Negative Judgment.

let us take the case where I recall placing my

pencil on the desk, and someone placed it elsewhere, say, on the bureau;
as I return to my desk and look for the pencil, I judge:

on the desk.

my pencil is not

By this very judgment that I claim something is not

the pencil is not on the desk, a non-being is thereby introduced.

,

namely
This

non-being, however, is not derived from negative judgment; rather, negative

"

6o

judgment is derived from non-being.

(Sartre obviously derived this idea

from Heidegger* s essay on "What Is Metaphysics
?“)

Thus the notions of

interrogation, destruction, and negative
judgment each introduces its

particular form or forms of non-being, and,
according to Sartre, the source
of all non-being is to be found in the
For-itself, that is, the human con-

sciousness which all three notions presuppose. P
'Bef ore we elaborate on

Sartre *s concept of non-being, let us first look
into the positions which
Sartre rejects; these are the dialectical concept
of nothingness of Kegel

and the phenomenological concept of nothingness of
Heidegger.
According to ;artre, Hegel conceives of pure being and
pure non-being
as

abstractions which could be reunited only on the basis of concrete
90
realities # “ and “the true concrete is the Existent with its essence:
it
‘'two

is the totality produced by the synthetic integration of all
the abstract

moments which are surpassed in it by requiring their complement. 91fiegel
follows Spinoza »s ojmis determinatio est ne?otio and asserts that all
being

receives its determination from non-being, in which case non-being is inserted into being itself •

Kegel writes

:

“This pure Being is pure abstrac-

tion and consequently absolute negation, which taken in its immediate

moment is also non-being. “

Q 2,

We must conclude, then, for Kegel pure being

and pure non-being are the same thing.

Or more accurately, Hegel has in-

serted non-being in being itself, all being is at the same time non-being.

Sartre explicitly rejects this position; he, on the contrary, claims that
non-being is outside being; being is invariable prior to non-being.

VJe

shall soon see how this explanation is possible for Sartre.
Heidegger, on the other hand, as we have seen, stresses the tension

3
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between bein? and non-being. 9 Eaeh of these is
regarded as an antagonistic
force, and their mutual repulsion engenders the
real.

In his analysis of

various modes of human conduct (hate, prohibition, regret,
etc.) Heidegger
concludes that each mode includes the apprehension, under
one form or
another, of nothingness.

And the human attitude which engenders the funda-

mental confrontation of nothingness is anguish
recognizes himself as a being-toward-death
tude) and the contingency of the world.

(

(

Angst ) wherein the Dasein

Seln-zum-Tode . radical fini-

Human reality emerges from an

awareness of what his being is in the face of what he is not.

And the

world as contingent can be disclosed only by human reality, which, in this
sense, imposes the contingent dimension on the world.

realizes the world as contingent, raises the question:

Human reality as it

"How does it happen

that there is something rather than nothing?" and in so doing it recog-

nizes the world as "suspended" in nothingness ....
Both these positions are inacceptable to Sartre, for they have over-

looked the structure of the mind , wherein alone the origin of non-being is
found.

We must, however, recognize that Heidegger* s position has brought

us closer to Sartre* s position.

Heidegger, while explaining the more basic

modes of nothingness, failed to account for the less significant modes,
such as "the pencil is not on the table," "the unicorn does not exist,"
etc.

But since very negation ("negatities") is s\xpr>orted by being, and

furthermore, each negation is the intrinsic constituent of the reality of

being as revealed to the subject, clearly, then, we cannot ignore these
"minor" negations.
Sartre, then, asserts against Hegel that non-being is "outside" of being
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but, nevertheless, always appears against a
background of being.
is it that makes this non-being possible?

’What is it

non-being and by which non-being "happens to things?"

But what

that generates this
We have seen that

whatever appears must always appear to a consciousness,
and that Being-initself simply is, that is, it is neither passive nor
active.

Furthermore,

dartre asserts that in knowing the consciousness knows what
it knows by
eliminating all that which is not what it knows.

consciousness introduces negation.
in the lor— itself,

Consequently, in knowing,

Hence, non-being must find its origin

i&rlier we concluded that destruction, insofar as we

consider this notion to imply "change," i.e., form A is destroyed if it has

been changed to another form E, introduces non-being.

By this Sartre

meant that only human consciousness can understand annihilation of, say,
a form A.

oartre seems to suggest that to understand destruction, that is

destruction if it is to be meaningful, we must presuppose the presence of
a human consciousness, rather than the idea that no destruction is possible

in the absence of a human witness.

Again in negative judgment non-being

is exposed, for to make the judgment that "my pencil is not on the table"

is to assume that I would recognize my pencil if I should see it| and this

recognition is possible only by eliminating all that which is not my pencil.

Thus, for Sartre, it is from human consciousness wherein all non-

being emerge, and, in fact, every act of knowledge implies the nihilatin(T
power of the For-itself.

The Por-itself, then, continuously generates non-

being through which it can organize, limit, and order the universe.
The next question put to Sartre with particular urgency is:

vhat is

the nature of human consciousness such that nothingness comes to things ?
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This power to nihilate, to generate
non-being is a peculiar characteristic

of the human consciousness alone and
is called ”neantisation.»? 4The ap-

proximate English translation of this
term could be either "nihilation.”
’’negation," or "noughting.”

In its activity of negation the human
con-

sciousness, or the For-itself, is viewed as
that which is ’’outside” of the

Eeing-in-itself.

The For-itself. unlike the In-itself, is
not massive,

dense, or full being.

trou dans l’etre”).

It is, if you will, a hole in Being-in-itself
(”un
We:re

it otherwise, this negating capacity would vanish.

For according to Fartre, only ”what is not”
is able to understand ”vhat
is.”

This simply means only ”what is not Being-in-itself”
is able to

apprehend ”what is Being-in-itself.”

Thus Sartre concludes,

Reing-for-

itself is not Being-in-itself, ”it is its own non-being.” 95 '
let us here recall Sartre's previous conclusion:

essence posits the possibility of a negative reply.

every question in
Then it is always

possible that the being in question may unveil itself as a Nothingness,
and consequently the questioner in realizing this nihilating withdrawal
in

relation to the given must view the presentation as perpetually fluctuating

between being and Nothingness.

It is essential, therefore, that the

questioner has the permanent possibility of disassociating himself from the
causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being.
The questioner (For-itself) then, must be isolated, detached, disengaged

from and outside of Being-in-itself if he is to have the possibility of
bringing forth non-being.

lie

must, therefore, lie outside of the deter-

ministic framework that characterizes the world.

In sum, human consciousness

must be free : freedom must be the being of consciousness.

In this context
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then, just as ny past is not the oondition
of my present, my present is

not the oondition of my future.

My past does not determine my present

because there is "nothin,?" in me which lends
itself to determination. 96
Then, according to Sartre, what I was
is not the foundation of what X am

any more than what I am is the foundation
of what I shall be.
This freedom which manifests itself and of
which we are conscious

emerges from our consciousness of anguish
97
("angoisse"). As I face the nossibles, my possibles, which I alone can determine,
I am anguished.

Anguish

is nothing other than this fear which is induced
in me as I confront my

possibles in the light of the responsibilities entailed
in my determining

these possibles.
Before we proceed further in our exposition, let us here recapitulate

dartre’s main contentions.

First, we may say that non-being and negation

under the various forms we have examined, namely, interrogation, destruction, and negative judgment, find their origin in the form of Nothingness

inherent in the heart of consciousness itself.

Thus, it is in the absolute

and pure subjectivity of human consciousness that the origin of non-being

which we ascribe to things is found.

Secondly, this power of "nihilation"

or "nihilating withdrawal” of the For-itself , which continuously generates

non-being into the world, is known as "neantisation."

And every judgment

and act of knowledge is in some form a "neantisation" (negation).

Thirdly,

since human consciousness can generate non-being, it is a characteristic of

the human consciousness that it is its own non-being, its own nihilation.
Fourthly, insofar as tho For-itself generates non-being, it itself must lie
’'outside" of being (Being-in-itself )

,

and this means precisely that it is

"

.
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free, that is. it is disengaged
from the causal order of
Belng-in-itself
The For-itself, then, is freedom.
At this point it must be
apparent to
the reader that Sartre uses the
terms "For-itself," "human reality,"

"human consciousness," "Nothingness."
"consciousness" and to a certain
extent even "nlhllation" synonomously.
Nihilation. however, as we shall
see later, is the act by which
the For-itself projects toward the
Initself , and artre frequently adopts
the term "ecstasy to designate this
act.
esta sy, as it were, is the act by
which the For-itself escapes from
itself toward the Being-in-ite.lf in
Imowinr. desiring, judging, etc.
.
1

rom this peripheral exposition we can
already detect the radical

separation between the two regions of Being
in Sartre *s system.

This oppo-

sition will be subject to further emphasis as
we proceed along our exposition.

Our next step is to show how Sartre, through
his notion of bad

shows how the For-itself in its very being is
permeated with nothingness.
b.

Bad Faith^ 8

In our previous discussion we have concluded that
consciousness for

Sartre is "a being such that in its being, its being is in
question insofar
as this being implies a being other than itself .""And with our analysis
of

the theory and the forms of negation, we were led to the conclusion
that

Sartre sees consciousness as a being "the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being. 100 But this does not suffice, for

the human consciousness is not only the being by whom "negations" are disclosed in the world; it is also the being who "can take negative attitudes

with respect to himself ."

101

lloreover, "it constitutes itself in its own

«
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flesh as the nlhllation of a
possibility vhioh another human reality
proX02
jeets as its possibility.
Thus, when a prisoner attempts to
escape,
he regards the policeman guarding
the gate as a No£.

indeed some men

(e.g.. caretakers, overseers, goalers)
are constantly regarded as Not to

the extent that the Not is inherent
in their very subjectivities which
they establish as a perpetual negation. 103
0ther attitudes, such as irony,

penetrate even deeper into the consciousness.

In irony a man negates

what he posits s he makes an affirmation which
demands itself to be understood as a negation; "he creates a positive
object which has no being
other than its own nothingness. 104 This form of
subtle behavior leads to

the following questions

T

,Vhat

is the being of consciousness which has the

possibility of denying itself?

This kind of behavior, however, does not

lend itself to generalization.

It appears then the best approach would

be to examine

one

attitude which is essential to human reality and, as

such, it directs its negation toward itself.

bad faith

(

This is the attitude of

mauvajse fol). 10 ^

Bad faith, unlike the general form of falsehood, is directed toward

oneself.

The essence of a lie or falsehood supposes that the person

uttering the lie is in complete possession of the truth.

Its aim is to

deceive the other person toward whom the lie is directed.

Lie as such

does not involve the inner structure of present consciousness, for all the

negations which constitute it bear on objects which are removed from consciousness; these objects do not exist, they are transcendent.

Here, of

course, we are speaking of the ideal lie, wherein the liar is not the vic-

tim of his own lie.

Frequently, however, the liar is, to a certain degree

"

6?

a victim of his own lie.
that is. he tries to convince
himself of his own
lie.
These more common forms of lie
appear somewhere between the ideal
lie and bad faith. In bad faith
the lie is directed toward oneself.

Usually the person who is practicing
bad faith is covering with an opaque
screen some unpleasant truth, or else
he is presenting as truth some

pleasant untruth.

Here there does not exist the duality
of the deceiver

and the deceived, both the deceiver and
the deceived are one and the same
subject, it implies in essence the unity
of a single consciousness.

Thus

the deceiver must know in his oapacity as
deceiver the truth which is

hidden from him in his capacity as the one
deceived.

Moreover, the deceiver

must know the truth exactly in order to conceal
it more carefully and he
10
does this "in the unitary structure of a
single project.
^But how is it

possible that the lie should still subsist when the duality
which conditions it has vanished?

And since bad faith demands of the person afflicted

with this condition to be conscious (of) his bad faith, it would
seem that
to the extent he is conscious (of) his bad faith he is in good
faith.

would appear that bad faith on principle obviates itself.

It

For Sartre,

however, these difficulties are not as crippling as they might appear
at

first glance.

Indeed, bad faith is very precarious, it is "metastable"

(unstable, subject to sudden change) and fluctuates between good faith

and "cynicism" (the deliberate attempt to deceive oneself—an extreme form
of bad faith), but nevertheless, it presents an autonomous and durable
form.

A person who lives in bad faith may have occasional awakenings to

his own "cynicism" or good faith, yet there is still this prevalent characteristic to his life.
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This parade* of bad faith does not
lend itaelf to the sort of
peyohoanalytioal explioation provided by
the dualism of the Ego and the Id.
The
dissimulation of bad faith supposes the
unity of a single psyohio organism
in which the same thing is yelled and
unveiled, known and unknown, accepted
and at the same time rejected. The
duality of Bfeo and the Id favored by
the psychoanalysts is seen to replace
the duality of the deceived and the

deoelver. and this Sartre does not allow,
for the notion of bad faith
supposes psychic unity in human consciousness.

Dualism then, is alto-

gether inadequate to explain that which essentially
supposes unity.
For purposes of clarification we shall examine
the patterns of bad

faith and attempt a description of them.

must seek to answer the question:

In this regard, therefore, we

"What must be the being of man if he

is to be capable of bad faith?"
A typical example o? bad faith is when a woman
who consents to go out

with a man for the first time, well aware of his intentions, yet
ignoring
these his less noble intentions.

The man»s conduct, discreet or otherwise,

may be conducive of certain conclusions which the woman may refuse to
recognize.

And her interpretation of his conduct is subjectively imposed;

she conjures up the interpretation to suit her modest temperament; she

procrastinates the urgent need for a decision while in constant recogni-

tion of the unavoidable eventual confrontation with her choice.

She evalu-

ates the actions and the conduct of the man at face value, that is, as
Being—in—itself ; she reflects only on the superficial and refuses to ack-

nowledge that which is ostensively concealed.

And finally she rejects her-

self as that which stimulated the conduct in the man, and instead realizes
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herself as not being her own body
but rather as an object,
itself.

a

Being-in-

Thus, she is at once transcendence
and facticity* transcendence

insofar as she surpasses herself as not
being herself, and factioity

insofar as she realizes herself as an
object and interprets at face value

only the overt conduct of the man.

These two properties are coordinated

and realized in bad faith such that
one necessarily implies the other.

And because in bad faith is manifest the
property of transcendence, its
aim becomes that of establishing the notion
that "I am not what I am.”

In

transcendence the self regards itself as a thing and
tries to flee and
escape from it, yet at the same time remaining
unwaiveringly itself.

Hence,

In affirming transcendence as being facticity, the self
is at once affirming facticity as being transcendence.

The self, then, is defined by the

concept of ”transcendence-facticity” in this manner, is metastable
,
for in
bad faith the self fluctuates between transcendence
and facticity.

concept, however basic, is but one aspect of bad faith.

This

Another aspect

inherent in bad faith is the duplicity derived from human reality which
can

be expressed in the following manner:

the Being-for-itself of human

reality implies complementarily a Being-for-others .

Implicative here is

the idea that to any particular conduct two interpretations are always

possible— that of the Self and that of the Other.

Although, ontologically

speaking, these two ”looks” have different status, this, however, does not

suggest that the Self is in a privileged position to apprehend the "being,"

whereas the Other apprehends only the appearance.

According to Sartre,

then, these different aspects of bad faith converge upon the same structure,

that is, the structure which demands that human reality must be viewed as
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a being ’’which is what it
is not and which is not what it is.”

Here

again, like our analysis of the forms
of negation, there appears a form
of duality which is "integrated” in
the unity of consciousness.

But how is it possible for the For-itself
to be conscious of these

concepts of continual oscillation?

In this connection let us consider

the antithesis of bad faith, namely, the
concept of sincerity.

In sin-

cerity the self must be for itself only what it
is, but this requires the
self to be identical to itself, hence a
Being-in-itself.

But if bad

faith is to induce illusion and good faith is
to remain as an ideal which

human reality strives for, then we cannot allow this
principle of iden-

tity to subsist, at least not in this oontext.

For this concept of iden-

tity removes the possibility of bad faith and makes good faith
the being
of human reality,

3eing-in-itself .

Pan exists as consciousness of being and not as a
No human condition typifies him as a being which is

exactly what he is. in other words as a Being-in-itself.

Here Sartre sub-

stantiates this claim with the example of the waiter of a cafe,

plification let us call him Pierre.

for sim-

The conduct peculiar to a waiter

does not express his being what he is, but instead expresses his "playing

being a waiter in a cafe”; he plays with his condition to realize it.
The waiter cannot be immediately a waiter in the sense that this inkwell
is an inkwell.

The waiter reflects on his condition as a waiter, he

realizes that it is precisely this person (the waiter) that he must be but

which he is not.

But Pierre can be a waiter only in representation, he

represents himself as a waiter, and to this degree there is no denying that
Pierre is a waiter.

However, he is not a waiter in the mode of Being-in
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itself but in the node of being what he
is not.

The discrepancy lies in

the fact that the sub.leot oannot be
identical to the obleoti no natter how

Insistent Pierre nay be in positing himself
as this being, by this very

positing he has surpassed this being, and not
toward another being, mind
you, but toward emptiness, toward nothingness.

Looking ahead then, sincer-

ity is an impossible task to achieve 109 its very
structure implies contrai

diction with the structure of human consciousness—
the being which is

necessarily not what it is and is what it is not.

With human consciousness

comes a form of fluidity which enables the For-itself
to escape identi-

fication to any particular human condition.

Lack of us is that "divine

absence” of which Paul Valery speaks*

Consider now the mode of being that concerns only a single self; that
cf

being sad.

Surely here is manifest the essence of sincerity, namely, I

am sad in the mode of being what I am#

There seems no apparent reason to

suppose the infiltration of any element of bad faith.

But to be sad means

only to make oneself sad, which implies that I am not sad prior to making

myself sad.

This process is continuous rather than a spontaneous event

which generates sufficient momentum to perpetuate this state of consciousness (oonsoiousness (of) being

sad— sadness).

Then to the extent that I

make myself sad I may lose myself in being sad and consequently I play at
being-sad.

Here again nothing else is at stake other than the fundamental

structure of human reality which is not what it is and is what it is not.

Human consciousness is never supported by being which is its own substantial being.

Consciousness is manifest as consciousness in acting which

constitutes its being.

Consciousness is its own being, that is. It is the

.

»
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revelation of being but that it is
not itself being.

To the extent that

gooo faith Imposes on consciousness
a block identity, deaands
it to be

Being-ln-itself. to be what it is. it
is irreconcilable to the fundamental structure of For-itself
let us substantiate this concept
with one final example.

The thief

who steals is frequently haunted by
an intolerable feeling of guilt. He
blames his inclination to steal on the
misgivings of fate; he considers
his predicament "different" from those
of other thief s; he would vehe-

mently refuse to characterize himself as a thief,
for this is not an innate
and permanent quality. Here is clearly a
man in bad faith, who, while
acknowledging all the facts imputed to him, refuses
to draw the conclusion

which they impose.

If a friend should critioize his inconsistent behavior,

he may show himself indulgent and admit to the fact
that he is a thief, in

which case, by acknowledging that he is what he is, he
is to this degree
110ml
sincere.
lhe condition of bad faith induces him to reject
that he is a
thing in the sense that his condition is a permanent one,
i.e., his mis-

takes constitute for him a destiny.

Writh the recognition of each misdeed

he feels that he is born anew, pure and undetermined.

This is certainly

acceptable if he intends his assertion "I am not a thief" to mean "I am not

what I am."

That is, if he declared to himself, "To the extent that a

pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a thief, and to the extent
that I have adopted this conduct, I am a thief.

But to the extent that

human reality escapes final definition by patterns of conduct, I am not
one."^^I)ut if he "slides surreptitiously towards a different connotation
of

*

being,* he understands *not being* in the sense of

*

not* Being *in-it self.
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He lays claim to *not being a thief*
in the sense whioh this table is
not
112
an inkwell. He is in bad faith.”
In sincerity the thief recognizes himself
as a thief and submits a

public confession.

In so doing he hopes to have surpassed his
condition?

to phrase it differently, he hopes to be
regarded as no longer being the
same thief whom he acknowledged as being and
thus escape into the region

of freedom and of good will.

He attempts to reassure himself and escane

from himself by self-contemplation (introspection).
a thief, as a Being-in-itself .

He regards himself as

He hopes to establish his freedom through

his confession and self-discovery.

He forces his new self on the Other.

But are these not precisely the phenomena of bad faith?

Both bad faith

and sincerity then characterize an escape from oneself.
Je

can conclude then in sincerity one passes continuously from ”the

being which is what it is, to the being whioh is not what it is and in-

versely from the being which is not what it is to the being which is what
it is."
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likewise bad faith causes me "to be what I am in the mode of

•not being what on© is,» or not to be what I am in the mode of ‘being what

one is I"
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Bad faith and sincerity are inextricably related, indeed bad

faith is possible only because sincerity itself is founded in bad faith.

And the underlying condition of the possibility for bad faith is that
"human reality, in its most immediate being, in the intra structure of the

pre-reflective cogjto . must be what it is not and not what it is." 11

"’

Sartre, by his specious definition of For-itself, as that being which
is what it is not and is not what it is, sought to render the inherent and

essential paradox of the fissure in the massivity of being (Being-in-itself)
and this fissure is none other than consciousness.

As the previous remarks
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on the analysis of bad faith have
demonstrated, the For-itself oscillates

continuously between the being which is
not what it is and the being
which is what it is not.

Consciousness, as it continually escapes
block

identity, eoncretization and permanence
is permeated with nothingness.

This analysis, apart from its incommensurable
value in preparing the

ground work for an investigation of the structures
of consciousness reveals
Sartre as a master dialeotitian pursuing,
in one of the few instances,
a genuine phenomenological analysis.

The next project put to us with

particular urgency is an investigation of the immediate
structures of consciousness.
o.
’/ith

The Structures of Consciousness.

our remarks on his Introduction, on the negations,
on bad faith,

and briefly on freedom, we have established Sartre*
s main postulates.

The

remaining of his treatise, although of considerable length, is
but an ela-

boration and development of the positions already outlined.

Thus our whole

task is reduced to the problem of the relation between the
Being-for-itself

and the Being-in-itself .

V7e

have already attempted a brief and super-

ficial distinction between the opacity of the Being-in-itself and the trans-

lucidity of the Being—for— itself •

.Je

must now direct ourselves to an

examination of the immediate structures of the Being-for-itself, in hopes

of clarifying the radical opposition between the two regions of being.

Our

conaem here is with the immediate, if not fundamental structures of consciousness.

These are:

(a) Impersonality;

and desire, and (d) values and Possibles.

(b) ftonsubstantiality,

(c) lack

We shall oonsider eaoh in turn.
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(1) Impersonality

11 ^

All particular forms of consciousness,
as we have seen, must ultimately
require the presence of a pre-reflective
cogjto . Our previous investigations lead us to conclude that the
pre-reflective cogito does not posit an
object, yet at the same time it is
autonomous and acts as a witness of its
own being. This witnessing, or what
Sartre calls "self-presence,” constitutes the relation of the subject to
itself, and as self-nrosenoe the

subject is indissolubly linked to itself.

In this self persists the per-

petually unstable equilibrium from the fact that
this self is not able to
achieve self-coincidence.

The pre-reflective cogito . therefore, must be

impersonal} that is, it does not constitute an Ego
as the unifying factor
of the successive representations of a consciousness.

This notion is de-

veloped in greater detail in an article entitled "The
Transcendence of the
Sgo." where Sartre argues explicitly against Husserl.

In this article

Sartre asserts that the Ego is a superfluous postulation, since
consciousness is defined by intentionality; that is, it is always
object
oreinted.

It is the objects (all objects of consciousness) that are the

stipulating and specifying elements of any individual consciousness, since

consciousness cannot exist without the objects of consciousness.

Even the

constant elements of consciousness such as personal identity cannot be

taken as the 3go; such a feeling of personal identity is rather "an acti-

vity of consciousness itself by means of a ‘transversal* intentionality." 117
This "transversal intentionality" is but a recollection of past conscious-

ness brought to the present.

Consciousness does not lend itself to eon-

cretisationj it is pure and absolute transluoidity whioh faces the massive
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opacity of Being-in-itself .

To introduce the massive and opaque
being of

the ago in consciousness is to
reduce the For-ltself into an In-itself
in
the mode of self identity. Such an
ego-logical structure would effect that

very artesian substantialization of
consciousness which Sartre rejects at
the outset.

Consciousness, according to Sartre, is permeated
by nothing-

ness and is unable to bear the weight of
the heavy and massive Ego. 115
In both the Cartesian and Kantian notions
of the Coglto . the conscious-

ness is regarded as an object of reflection.

And it is precisely from this

reflective act that the Ego is thought to emerge.

Thus Sartre sees the

Ego as the result and creation of the reflexive act.

In this sense the

Ego, like any other concept, is but the object of consciousness.

In the

event that I am conscious of, say, a chair, the Ego does
not emerge.

It is

misleading to assert that "I am conscious of a chair,” instead
it would be
more accurate to say "there-is-consciousness-of-a-chair."

In a reflective

act the object of consciousness appears concomitantly with self-oonsoiousness.

When I am conscious of this chair I am at once conscious that I am

conscious of this chair; and this in egological language would constitute

the Ego performing the reflexive act.

(We are here reminded of our previous

comments on the notion of the pr e-reflective Coglto .)

This is, of course,

inaccurate, for what Sartre meant to express by the concept of the pre-

reflective coglto is not the positing of an Ego but rather the fact of
immediate presence to self.

menological ontology.
Subject.

Sartre *s aim here is quite basic for his pheno-

He seeks to establish here a consciousness without

All Being-in-itself is external to consciousness, For-itself as

such is nothing but emptiness of Being-in-itself ; it is infected with

e
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nothingness.

The For-itself exists solely for
the object.

Consciousness

is deplete of being, it perpetuates
its absence of being j which is to say,
it is in a continuous process of nlhilatlon.
All the substantial value

that the For-itself

my

possess is borrowed from exteriority,
from Being-

in-itself toward which consciousness is
directed.

Consciousness Itself

must be devoid of all constant elements, and
consequently no egological
formulation is possible for consciousness
(2) Nonsubstantiality.

Again, a3 we have seen, Descartes fell into
error when he claimed

g figjtP

®E£L2.

SSa* "

In this formula Descartes assumed that the

elf is identical with the Self as thinking, that is,
the existing Self is

identical with the thinking Self, and concluded that the Self
must be a
"thinking substance."

This position trapped Descartes in a plethora of

difficulties and necessitated his postulating God to extricate him
from
this lonely predicament and to place him once again in the world.

This

difficulty seems to have originated from Descartes* initial choice.
Descartes made his point of departure from the reflective Cogito rather

than the pre-refleotive ooglto .

K© postulated "I think that I think" in-

stead of the more plausible "I think of something."

He did not recognize

the intentional character of consciousness, and as a consequence he fell

into an infinite regress having to posit a thinking being which reflects
on itself as a thinking being and so on and so forth.

Sartre was cautious

to avoid this fallacy and made his departure from the pre-reflective
cogito (the consciousness whioh is at once self-consciousness and conscious
/of/ something).

From consciousness emerges the nothingness of pure

translucidity which is invariably intentional,
directed towards that which
is beyond consciousness.

Consciousness

,

therefore, unlike the Cartesian

"thinking substance,” must be nonsubstantia 1.
xhe In-itself , insofar as it remains
consistent with the principle of

identity, that is, insofar as it is exactly
identical to what it is,

cannot have possibles.

"Its relation to possibles can only be established

2
from the outd.de, namely, by a being which faces
the possible s."^ §ut a

being which faces possibles must carry in itself the
ontological dimension
of non-being, for being acquires signification only against
the background
of non-being.

And since it is precisely through consciousness that non-

being happens to things, then to the extent that consciousness
implies

nothingness, to that very degree nothingness implies the possibility of

questioning being.

But if the For-itself is capable of nihilation and

negation} if it is by consciousness that non-being happens to things; if

nothingness emerges from consciousness, and if the For-itself is the being

which is not what it is and is what it is not, then it must necessarily
be nonsubstantial.

were it otherwise, For-itself would be relegated to the

realm of Being-in-itself , opaque and saturated with substance.
The concepts of consciousness as nothingness, as negation, as nihila-

tion, as a being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as impersonal,

as nonsubstantial are clearly intimately connected.

If we can establish

but one of these interrelated and interwoven concepts, we have essentially
established the others, for each necessarily implies the others.

These

concepts, if not concentric to one another, at least overlap one another.

And they all converge toward one central theme, namely, the translucidity

j
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and emptiness of consciousness.

Let us now examine the remsinirF
two struc-

tures of human consciousness! the
For-itself as lack and desire, and
the
for-itself as haunted by values and
possibles.
(3) Lack and Desire.

The process of nihilation does not
simply consist of an introduction
of
emptiness into consciousness. If the
For-itself is to sustain nihilation,
it must itself, in some sense, be a lack
l22
of be±r^.
lt is not as though an

external being has expelled the In-itself
from consciousness, rather the

For-itself is continuously determining itself
not to be a Being-in-itself
that is, it determines its being by means of
a being which it is not.

For-itself posits itself as not being the In-itself.

The

This mode of not

being is peculiar to the For-itself, for it touches
the inner nature of
the being which is not what it is not.

not being, i.e., a table is not a chair.

There are. however, other modes of
In this mode of not being, both

the table and the chair are left intaot, that is, untouched;
the relation

here is external, and it is established only by the presence
of a human
witness.

However, in contrast, there are negations which establish an

internal relation between what one denies and that concerning which the

denial is made.
that of lack.

The most characteristic of such internal negations is

This lack is engendered only through the upsurge of human

reality, and it is in no way contaminated by In-itself which, as it were,
is all positivity.

Insofar as lack appears only in a human world, it must

constitute three elements;

these are, according to Sartre:

’’that

which is

missing or 'the lacking,' that which misses what is lacking or 'the existing,'
and a totality which has been broken by the lacking which would be restored

p0

by the synthesis of »the lacking* and
»the existing*—that is 'the lacked.*"
Thus, when I say that the moon is not
full and that a quarter is lacking,
I

at once presuppose in my intuition that
quarter which is lacking.

For

it is only within the context of a realized
totality which constitutes
•’the

existing" and the lacking" that "the existing" as
missing "the lacking"

becomes intelligible.
as lacking.

The totality becomes the foundation of "the
existing"

The given itself simply is what it is; it is nothing
more than

a Being-in-itself , and we cannot say of it as
either complete or incomplete,

for it bears no relation to other beings.

"The lacking" is the complement

of "the existing" and together they form the synthetic
totality of "the

lacked."

But "the lacking," insofar as it is determined by the synthetic

whole, is constituted in the being of "the existing."

And likewise, it

is the full moon (the synthetic whole) which confers on the crescent
moon

("the existing") its being as crescent, which is to say it is what-is-not

that determines what-is.
If we assert with Sartre that lack is possible only through lack and

that lack appears only through human reality, then we are led to conclude
that, in some sense, human reality is itself a lack.
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The fact that human reality is a lack appears still more forcefully in

Sartre *s consideration of desire.

Here Sartre rejects the notion of desire

as a psychic state, for the covert assumption here is that desire manifests

the being whose nature is to be what it is.

But a being which is what it

is does not call for completion, it simply is.

The call for completion

arises when there is a human transcendence which surpasses the incomplete
toward the complete.

Thus an incomplete circle isolated from human con-
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sciousness simply is; it requires no
completion, for as an open curve it is

complete and full.

Then in the case of "hunger" or "thirst"
there need be

an external transcendence which can surpass
these desires toward the to-

tality "satisfied hunger" or "satisfied thirst."
>ior,

on the other hand, can we conceive of desire as a
conatus in the

manner of a physical force or drive, in effect, an
efficient cause.

m&s
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The

as a producer of states cannot be identified with
desire as the

appeal from states.

An organism manifesting certain symptoms may be inter-

preted as an organism deprived of water, but these symptoms are
positive
phenomena and refer to themselves only.

There can be no mental-physical

correspondence such that the physical symptoms posit a psychic state in
consciousness.

We have seen that psychic states as such cannot exist in

consciousness, for consciousness is empty.

If desire is to be desire to

itself, it must necessarily, by nature, be an escape from itself toward

the desired object.

Desire, then, is a lack of being and at the same time

haunted by the being of which it is desire.
We have seen that the bond between the existing and the lacking is not
one of simple contiguity.

Although the lacking is, strictly speaking,

absent, it is profoundly present in the heart of the existing, and this

is because the existing and the lacking are at the same moment apprehended

and surpassed in the unity of a single totality.
is lacking is lacking to ... for ••••

Hence everything which

The For-itself (to recall what we

said earlier) is its own nothingness; it is its own foundation insofar as
it denies in relation to itself a certain being or mode of being, and,

furthermore, it denies itself as a Being-in-itself.

What it lacks, then.

a
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is being, which if it possessed would
constitute for it a totality—

For-itself-in-itself.

Thus, to the extent that the For-itself
points

toward that which it lacks, it is haunted
by Fveing-in-itself .

The pro-

ject of the For-itself is directed toward
that perfection (the For-itself-

in-itself ) which constitutes the unified totality.

If such

were possible, then the For-itself would sustain
in itself

a

a

synthesis

real Self;

that is, the utopian identification of For-itself
and In-itself would thus

be realized.

The For-itself, as we have seen, incessantly
strives to

identify itself with the Being-in-itself , and its attempt
is again and
again frustrated, for such a synthesis is not possible.

In such a synthesis

there would be entailed certain contradictions, for instance,
the Foritself, which posits itself as a non-being, if it is contaminated
with In-

itself, could no longer possess the power of nihilation, nor its
translucidity} it would no longer be the being from which non-being, negation, and

nothingness emerge.
is what it is not.

Hor could it be the being which is not what it is and
Hence, a Being-for-itself can never be a Being-in-

itself without losing, Ipso facto , its most characteristic features of consciousness.

However, although this synthesis is unattainable, the For-

itself finds its signification in this haunting totality; the For-itself
must be seen as projecting towards this unified whole, this lack, this
impossible synthesis .

From this it becomes clear that the For-itself is

indissolubly linked to the In-itself in the manner of a lack to that which
defines its lack.

"statufioation

11

The For-itself does not lend itself to the sort of

which would be necessary if the For-itself is to be iden-

tified (synthesized) with the block, massive, full, and opaque In-itself.

.
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The F or-itself , then, on principle, can never
become a Being-in-itself
(4)

For-itself as Haunted by Values and Possibles

The F or-itself *s attempt to close this gap
created by its yearning to

be an In-itself gives rise to another aspect
of its basic structure, that
of value.

Value is the being which the For-itself continually
desires.

This aspiration, however, is clearly hopeless, for
we cannot reach absolute

fullness of being without thereby losing ourselves as
consciousness of
being, as emptiness of being.

Value is another one of those notions that

emerges with the apparition of human consciousness, and in this
sense

human consciousness must be the being by which values exist.
Value as a fundamental structure of the For-itself appears from a
con-

tradictory point of view.
"a tearing from

. . .

This is so because as project (nihilation) it is

towards" a not-self from In-itself which is other than

the For-itself and so helps to constitute the value of the For-itself* s

projection.

Value, then, stands beyond any individual consciousness and

haunts the For-itself as a being which the For-itself incessantly strives
for and to which it is indissolubly linked.

And because value is in-

separable from human reality, it cannot have the substantial and permanent

qualities which render it as something outside itself.

Here the only per-

manence is the contingent necessity by which the For-itself aspires toward
a form of being which is, in principle, unattainable.

Value, then, as the

expression of the For-itself* s persistent yet futile striving toward that

which is impossible, namely, Being-in-itself , emerges as a kind of permanent lack which is perpetually present.
Once again we have witnessed the notion of a For-itself aspiring for

something which it itself is not, and to this
extent at least, this lack

inherent in the :'or-itself refers to a transcendent
existent.

That which

the lor-itself lacks in order to constitute
itself as a complete self is

what dartre calls "possible."

Possibility, then, forms an integral part

of human reality since it expresses the protective
character of a Foritself which is constantly moving toward that which
it is not.

Possibility

is realized with the apparition of the human
consciousness as nihilation,

for it shows that "the "or-itself exists only insofar as
it remains at a
certain distance from itself as a being which both is and is not
its possibilities. "^

2

%ut

the For-itself does not possess "oossibilities" in the

manner it possesses objects, for possibilities cannot be separated from
human reality; possibilities provide, to a certain extent, the meaning of
human existence.

Nor is it permissible to speak of man as merely possi-

bility; possibility as possibility must always remain in some sense unfulfilled; possibility always entails at once a radical impossibility, were it

otherwise it would no longer be a possibility but an identity in the mode

of self-coincidence.

Just as we speak of the For-itself "nihilating , " we

oould in like manner speak of possibility "possibilatingj" for nihilation
is an act by which the For-itself realizes its own bein^ by projecting

towards that which it is not and whioh it never can be.

Possibility as

such requires human presence; it arises as soon as consciousness appears,
i.e., the full moon as a "possible" is a consequence of a human witness—

the For-itself surpasses beyond the crescent moon toward the full moon.
This form of surpassing is possible only because, in some sense, For-itself

if a possibility, an absence from itself, existing at a distance from it-
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self.

Cnee again is the underlying:
Implication that the For-itself does

not exist as a self-coincidence or a
thing.

Human consciousness, then, in

its nihilating movement toward its
own possibilities involves it in a re-

lation with what it is not, and in this
manner it projects toward a beyond,
a totality of existents which
constitutes the world.

Consciousness realizes

its relation with the world by regarding
it in terms of what it is not
itself.

The world as the totality of existents. that
is. as the In-itself.

towards which the For-itself incessantly strives,
serves as a constant

correlate of the For-itself* s projection toward
its own possibilities.

We

must, therefore, admit two elements; first the relation
of the For-itself
to its own possibility, this Sartre calls "Circuit of
Ipseity," and, secondly,
the totality of existents (the world) through which
the For-itself "tra-

verses" in its movement towards its own possibilities.

The For-itself in

its act of nihilating itself (asserting that it is not an In-itself)
pro-

vides In—itself with signification as that which consciousness is not;

consequently the In—itself becomes the objective correlate of the Foritself* e nihilating act.

The world existents take on meaning through

their relationship to the projects of the For-itself . 126 The In-itself and
the Tor-itself, thus regarded, are clearly distinct, yet inseparable, for

without In—itself there could be no For-itself, and conversely, without
For-itself the world as object of consciousness could not subsist.
In the course of our exposition we have examined in some detail each

successive stage in the development of Sartre *s almost systematic project

of draining out all being from the For-itself.

In the examination of each

negative structure of consciousness (negation, interrogation, destruction,

P6

negative Judgment, bad faith, and sincerity)
Sartre arrived at the same
conclusion, namely the For-itself is empty
of being and that wherein which

nothingness resides.

Our subsequent investigations of consciousness

revealed more forcefully its impersonal and
nonsubstantial nature, and,
furthermore, consciousness is seen as a lack
which projects toward values

and possibles.

All this merely reinforces our original
conviction, and

although we have not yet penetrated the structure
of the In-itself , we have
clear indications of its antithetical nature as
it opposes the For-itself.

We have commented briefly on the nature of this
opposition, however, we
do not propose to elaborate on this opposition until we have
adequately
explicated the structure of the In-itself.

Suffice here to remind the

reader that this theme is of predominant importance and that
it constitutes the very purpose of Sartre* s Being and Nothingness .
d.

Consciousness and Time.

The examination of the various structures and activities peculiar to

human consciousness has led Sartre to attempt to establish a more inclusive
principle that will unite these interrelated structures and activities.

Uke

Heidegger, Sartre believes that this principle is to be found in the

concept of temporality.

This is a natural, if not unavoidable, conse-

quence of the preceding development, since like Heidegger, Sartre regards
the self as the being which continually projects itself beyond itself toward

that which it is not and perhaps even more relevant, Sartre asserts with

Heidegger that all the activities of the Foiwits^lf hapnen "in time."
us now consider eaoh of the three temporal dimensions which constitute

Sartre* s phenomenological description of temporality.

12 ?

let

8?

(X)

Past^^

The concept of "passivity" of human
sensations which is frequently conceived as some form of present cerebral
trace of the past by the psycho-

logiste nust new be rejected, for according
to Sartre, just as the extended

cannot be explained by means of the
unextended, the past oannot be explained

by the present.

Moreover, Sartre also rejects any suggestion
that pur-

ports to explain the past as something unreal,
or as Bergson oonoelved It,
as a purely "honorary existence."

Doth these conceptions of the pest iso-

late the pa3t from the present, and furthermore
these notions presuppose

the consciousness as some sort of solidified being,
a Being-in-itself.
Buoh a conception of consciousness obviates all hope
for an adequate explana-

tion of the past.
Here as elsewhere Sartre remains unwaiveringly faithful to
his original

notion of the

or-itself , and through it he will attempt a solution to the

problem of temporality.

Insofar as the In-itself is full, massive, dense,

and compact being, it can have neither a history nor a past, neither a

present nor a future; it simply
fluous.
it.

is— it

is gratuitous, unjustified and super-

It has a past only insofar as a human witness makes reference to

A house that was once green and is now painted red does not have the

color green as its past.

Only in the memory of a human consciousness could

remain an image of a green house.
house would be lost forever.

Apart from human consciousness the green

Only the human consciousness can support this

particular past state, namely, the once green color of the house.
account, however, Sartre may be challenged.

Cn this

One might argue that, in some

sense, a nail used a second time may not perform its faction as efficiently.
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and that in this sense it carries
its past with it.

To this Sartre would

reply that even in this case the past
no longer is, for there exists a
new molecular structure in the nail
that affords a different genre of activity. And that in this sense no
permanence whatsoever may persist. On
this point Sartre is not totally convincing.
In considering the past of the For-itself
Sartre asserts that it is

but the "solidification" of the For-itself.

In saying "I was angry" I am

referring to a past state wherein no possible may
reside, this past state,
then, becomes an In-itself.

And Insofar as I refer to this my past I am

facing it as an In- itself, as an external thing.
always "I was my past."

I am never my past, but

The For-itself as a being wherein freedom is mani-

fest and wherein possibilities reside, cannot be
identified with its past.
The

or-itself is always beyond what it is.
(2) Present.

According to Cartre when we speak of the present we mean to be present
to something . and this something is invariably a Being-in-itself .

the For-itself can be present to something.

Thus only

The In-itself merely is.

To

be present means to be in contact with In-itself without being identified

with it.

And this is possible only because the For-itself negates the In-

itself as that to which it is present.

(On this point Sartre, unlike

Heidegger, stresses the For-itself as apprehension of the massive Being-in-

itself as negation of itself.)

Here again we are reminded of the basic in-

tentional structure of the For-itself.

Thus regarded the present is a

flight from Being-in-itself, for the For-itself posits the In-itself and
negates it at the same time.

"The present instant is a fictive deification’

»
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which in fact does not exist. 130 The present,
then, is not.

It is s flight

oy the "or-itself from the bein that
it was (its past) toward the being:
B
that it will be (its future). We are
thus led to conclude that the For-

itself as present is not what it is
(past) and is what it is not (future).
As in our previous analyses, here a-ain,
i. evidence of Sartre’s remarkable
consistency.
(3) Future.

Just as there is no past without the human
consciousness, there could

be no future without human consciousness.
In-itself has no past, it has no future.

And furthermore, just as the
The For-itself, on the other hand,

knows and plans its future or anticipates its future
insofar as it faces

the future.

The future is related to a possibility which is already
con-

tained in the For-itself.

In this sense the For-itself projects toward the

future only to come back to itself.

It is, in short, a relation and a

position of the For-itself to For-itself.
The future as that toward which the For-itself projects must define

each movement of consciousness.

specified by the future.

Fach of our gestures is explained and

This future is the expression of the fundamental

incompleteness of our being; it constitutes that lacking being toward which
the For-itself aspires.

Without this lacking being, the For-itself would

suffer the weight of identification with the In-itself.

This is why we

must again apprehend For-itself as a non-being whose complement is at a
distance .

The lacking as such, however, is never reached.

While the past

is empty of possibilities, the future is overflowing with possibilities.

These possibilities are precarious for the For-itself as freedom may or may
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not realize them.

Thus the future as possibility, as that toward
which the

For-itself aspires, must remain eternally problematic,
eternally in question, and eternally unfulfilled.
V/ith

his description of the three temporal modes Sartre is prepared
to

attempt to establish time as an organic unity.

Here Sartre differentiates

between that order of successive events (before and after) which can be
characterized as static temporality and that progression whereby the present becomes the past and the future becomes the present, which can be

characterized as dynamic temporality .
In static temporality it is the instant which is itself before some

instants and after others.

The instant in isolation is intemporal, for

temporality always posits a succession or progression of instants.

If,

however, we assign the character of In-itself to two instants, we cannot

establish a tie between them.
lies outside.

The link must be sought in a being which

Descartes assigned this task to God; Kant chose an intem-

poral "Self" for this function.

Both these solutions require of the intem-

poral to perform the task of temporalizing .

Sartre, however, feels that

he can avoid this difficulty by malting before and after an internal rela-

tion which is only intelligible to and relatable by a being which is itself
in some sense before itself.

Thus the For-itself can be conceived ns the

being which can make intelligible the notion of before-after.

The r or-

itself alone can bring unity into the succession of time.
The past as past constitutes for the For-itself its own past.

Although

theFFor-ltself cannot be identified with its own past, it nevertheless
carries it behind itself as its solidified and immutable background.

In
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this regard Sartre expresses this
facing-the-past as an ecstasy toward
the
past, that is. in the sense of
"standing out from" the past. likewise

there is the ecstasy which is an upsurge
into the future, a project toward

completion which is never to be attained.
present.
to being.

The third ecstasy involves the

In this ecstasy For-itself escapes
from itself as it is present

Although Sartre does not grant this ecstasy any
ontological

priority, he nevertheless considers it the basis
of the other ecstasies.

Unlike Heidegger, Sartre is not willing to
give priority to the future.
The three moments of temporality, insofar as
any particular moment will

necessarily involve the others, are interrelated. 133And each
temporal factor
of the ror-itself is a futile projection which on the
one hand seeks to

strive toward self-coincidence and on the other hand to
maintain itself

intact as the being of consciousness.

Sartre expresses this dispersive

nature of these three temporal moments as the "diasporic" mode of
the Foritself* s being.

With respect to dynamic temporality, ^ ^Sartre considers the following
questions

duration?"

"Why does the present become the past?"
'"/hat

is the meaning of progress?"

Sartre investigates the meaning of progress.

m ftiat

is the meaning of

To answer these questions

According to Sartre progress

cannot be explained in terms of change; progress is understandable only in

light of the fundamental incompleteness of the For-itself, which in its
endless yet futile pursuit of In-itself constitutes the source of time.

The

For-itself, therefore, is the denial of the instant (nresent), the rejection
of the past, and the pursuit of the future.

If there were

progress and,

therefore, no duration, then the For-itself would be a solidified past and
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a statufied future, in short, a
Being-in-itself .

Thus progression in tine

finds its signification in the structure
of the For-itself , and conversely

there could be no For-itself without progress
in tine.

The For-itself is

a perpetual flight away from the past
toward the future.
e.

Pure and Impure Reflection

Our final remarks on consciousness will concern
Sartre’s notion of reflection.

This notion, however, must not be confounded
with Sartre’s previous

notion of the ^.re-reflective coglto .

The pre-refleetive coglto is non-

positional consciousness of self; it is non-reflecting
consciousness or,
as o art re calls it, "non-thetie consciousness,*’
"conscience non-positiorelle
(de) soi."

Reflection, on the other hand, is authentic reflection; here

the Tor-itself clearly and explicitly reflects on itself by
positing itself.
rom this "scissiparity" of reflection emerges a double being

(a dyad),

namely, the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciences s-w
the

ref lecting-reflooted.

Thus the reflecting consciousness must in some way

also be the consciousness which it reflects.

And paradoxically the re-

flected consciousness must remain an object of reflection, for Sartre rejects absolute identification.

The ontological structure of reflection is

similar to the relation between For-itself and In-itself.

We have seen that

it is nothingness which separates the For-itself and the In-itself, and In
like manner nothingness separates the reflecting consciousness and the re-

flected consciousness.

In the case of the For-itself and the In-itself

the nlhilation was performed outside of consciousness, that is, it was

directed at the In-itself.

In reflection, however, the nlhilation is per-

formed within consciousness itself.

136
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In reflection the For-itself seeks
to achieve identity and coincidence

with itself in such a way as to leave
the For-itself intact.
this reason that the For-itself posits
itself as an object.

It is for

But this at-

tempt is doomed to failure, for the intentional
structure of the For-

itself affirms itself as

rjo£

being the object upon which it is directed.

In its attempt to capture itself as an
object the For-itself must surpass

itself and express itself as something other
than this object.
another point of view this difficulty again
proves insuperable.

From

Insofar

as the For-itself is a being through which
negations emerge, it cannot

grasp itself as an In-itself without first negating
it.

And by negating

itself as an In-itself it can no longer grasp itself as
In-itself.

To

succeed the F or-itself must transform itself into an
In-itself while at the
same time preserving Itself as

fest impossibility.

I'

or-itself, this as we have seen is a mani-

"The For-itself can never be completely objectified

and internalized at the same time." 13 ?The most characteristic feature of the
For-itself, then, is this permanent impossibility of stabilization.
There are, however, two modes of reflection, the pure and the impure .

In pure reflection the reflecting consciousness is directed upon the naked

reflected consciousness (the non— positional consciousness) treated as a
"quasi-object.”

This mode of reflection, however, is limited, for there

must necessarily be a gap between the reflecting and the reflected j but this
is not to suggest that the reflected consciousness is merely a datum of

consciousness which stands completely detached from consciousness and exists
as other than consciousness, for as we have suggested, there is a certain

identity between them.

This act of reflection penetrates the reflected
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consciousness in all three of its temporal
moments, for the temporal

moments constitute an integral ontological
aspect of the For-itself.

Hence,

reflection is consciousness of the three
temporal modes.
In impure reflection consciousness
considers itself as saturated with

the succession of particular psychic states,
i.e., desires, passions,
emotions, affections, and other factors that
make up our everyday psychic
life.

This mode of reflection Sartre calls "psychic
temporality."

Insofar

as these particular moments constitute
the individual’s psychic life, they

are very much a part of consciousness and
consequently in this sense cannot

be reduced to a complete In-itself.

On this point, however, Sartre is not

very clear; he sometimes calls the psyche

a

"hypostatized For-itself" and

other times he refers to it as an inchoate form of In-itself.

With these

definitions the strict delineation between the For-itself and the
In-itself
can no longer be maintained.

Concerning this problem, however, Sartre

seems to have, somewhat artificially, relegated the psyche to the
realm of

the Being-in-itself

,

since he regards In-itself as that which in the strict-

est sense is not For-itself.
The two modes of reflection are clearly interrelated.

Through the

purification of impure reflection we arrive at the pure reflection.

The

distinction between pure and impure reflection is necessary because from
this distinottion we can distinguish "original temporality" (revealed

through pure reflection) and "psychic temporality" which emerges from impure
reflection.

Insofar as psychic facts appear to consciousness through re-

flection, psychic temporality must always be

a

derivative form, and to this

degree it must be regarded as a Being-in-itself.

Furthermore, psychic

s

.
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temporality necessarily exists as that
which merely is or has been since
,
its constituents are a series of
"nows" or "those which have been."
Another characteristic feature of impure
reflection is that its psychic
facts invariably refer to a world
which appears as a kind of shadow accom-

—a

panying my existence
pure introspection.

shadow which is revealed to me in every
act of

This accompanying shadow may be "ideal"
but neverthe-

less is, since it is revealed to consciousness.
The primary concern in our analysis of
reflection is again to show the

impossibility of resolving this fundamental dilemma
which confronts the
;or-itself , namely, its futile desire and relentless
effort to be both
For-itself and In-itself ; to seek to appropriate the
In-itself yet remaining pure

T

or-itself .

How that we have the analysis of the first region of

being behind us, that is, the Being-for-itself we are in a
,
position to consider, in greater detail, the nature of that region of
being to which we

have so frequently alluded, namely, the Deing-in-itself
2.

Being *in-itself.
ctYipxtftfcd

why,

i

our description of the Being-for-itself , and we saw

or this aspect of being, Sartre chose as its guiding thread the

examination of negative attitudes, and why the underlying condition of the

For-itself must be its permanent possibility of non-being.
original goals, however, was to resolve the problem:

One of Sartre*

"What is the original

relation of human reality to the being of phenomenon or Being-in-itself ?"

And we concluded earlier that for Sartre this relation between the two
regions of being is a primitive up-surge, and it forms a part of the very
structure of the For-itself.

Indeed, this would not be an external relation
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conceived as uniting two substances
originally isolated, for the Being-initself is conceived as the synthetic
totality ( transphenomenal being) of

which the nonsubstantial consciousness,
like the phenomenon, constitutes

only the articulation.

On the one hand, the In-itself, in
order to be,

needs only itself, for it refers only to
itself.

On the ether hand, the

or-itself as its own nothingness is as far removed
as possible from the
In-itself.

The relation of the For-itself to the
In-itself, therefore,

cannot be founded in the In-itself. which as
In-itself simply
the relation is constitutive of the For-itself.
n
.

^

Rather

Thus such questions as

ince the In-itself is what it is, how and why does the
Being- for-itself

have Icnowledge of the Being-in-itself ?" and "What is knowledge
in general?"
characterize this relation that we are now pursuing.
a.

Knowledge as a Relation between the For-itself and the In-itself.

According to Sartre there is only intuitive knowledge.

Deduction and

discursive arguments are only instruments which lead to intuition, they
are not examples of knowing.

As soon as the intuition is reached, the

methods utilized to attain it are effaced before it.
cannot be understood as the presence of the thing

(

Intuition, however,

Sache) "ln person" to

consciousness as conceived by Husserl, for the In-itself can never by itself be presence.

It follows then, intuition is the presence of con-

sciousness to the thing.

Consciousness must of necessity be consciousness

/of/ (the brackets are to emphasize that the word is inserted for gramma-

tical reasons) something.

Consciousness which is not consciousness /of/

something would be consciousness /of/ nothing.

Consciousness in the form

of the "reflecting-ref looted" dyad, stipulates the condition that the re-
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fleeting exists only in order to
reflect the reflected, end that
the reflected is a reflected only insofar as
it refers to the reflecting The
two terns of this dyad, then, point
to each other, each subsisting
insofar
as the other subsists.

W*

have stated

presence.

wlier

that non-being is an essential strueture
of

Presence entails a radical negation as
presence to that which

one is not. which is to say. that that
which is present to me is what is not
me.

Furthermore, this non-being is implied, a
priori , in every theory of

knowledge, for any notion of an object is
possible only by an original act
of negation which would designate the object as
other than consciousness.
Thus the original relation of presence as the
foundation of knowledge is

negative.

Put negations as such emerge only through the For-itself.

Knowledge, then, is neither a relation, an activity, a
quality, nor a
virtue} it appears as a mode of being of the For-itself
insofar as it is
a

*’

presence to ..."

This original act of negation, it must be noted, refers

to an internal negation, in contradistinction to an external
negation.
us clarify this distinction.

Let

In an external negation a witness establishes

an external bond between two being, as in the case when I say "A chair is
J20t a

table.”

Here the foundation of this negation is clearly neither in

the table nor in the chair.
intact.

Both these objeots are left untouched and

As objeots they are simply what they are.

By an interna} negation,

on the contrary, “we understand such a relation between two beings that the

one which is denied the other qualifies the other at the heart of its

essence—by absence.”
assert:

14-0

Thus in the case of internal negation whereby I

”1 am not intelligent,” I intend prima facie to indicate that "not
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beins intelligent*’ is a certain negative
qualification of my being.

From
their nature it is evident that such
negations cannot be applied to being

In-itself , and that they must belong to the
Being-for-itself.

Only the

For-itself can be determined in its being by a
being which it is not.

And

if the internal negation can appear in the
world, it is only through the

For-itself that it comes into the world.

Only the For-itself, as the

being which can appear to itself as not being
what it knows, and can constitute knowledge, for only that which is not can
know that which is.
Here we must clear a common dilemma.

It is often objected that all

negations presuppose cognition as their prior condition,
for it is argued
one cannot negate without first possessing some knowledge
of that which one
is about to negate.

This objection hAs some merits; for it is undeniable

that consciousness is unable to know that from whioh it is completely
cut
off.

But here we must regard the qualities or thing denied as

tive factor of the being of the Being-for-itself

*'a

constitu-

^In faot it is in

terms of the being— otheivthan— consciousness that consciousness can make
known to itself that it is not.

Thus the ^ or— itself is the non-being which

receives its determination through the massive and opaque presence of the
Being-in-itself.

By this view Sartre opposes the concept of materialism

whioh purports to establish a substance (knower) in terms of another substance (object known) in hopes that they may be merged in one act of
knowledge.

An examplification of this original relation is found in the

case of fascination .

Fascination exemplifies the immediate fact of know-

ing where the knower vanishes under the overwhelming focus on the known.

Insofar as the knower is fascinated by the known, the knower is reduoed to
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pur. negation of the known. 142 Yet the
ft.oinated intuition remains at a
distance from the object, otherwise
the For-itself would merge in a
fusion

with the In-itself.

"In fact the condition necessary for
the existence of

fascination is that the object be raised in
absolute relief on a background of emptiness; that is, I (the
knower) am precisely the immediate

negation of the object and nothing but that.""^
Knowledge, then, expresses solely the fact
that "there is" being.

It

is pure solitude of the known in the sense
of immediate presenoe of the

known as pure dejj^gd Identity with the knower.

The term that best captures

the essence of knowledge is the verb "to realize."

Realize here covers

both the aspect of awareness and the aspect of malting.

Thus knowledge is

realization in this two-fold sense; I realize that "there
is" being (awareness of being), and I realize being (to make that which
appears, or to

make appear.)

Through my knowledge I make that "there is" being; through

my knowledge I make the world appear.

Here Heidegger's influence is appar-

ent, for it will be recalled that Heidegger, too, in this sense,
asserted

that "knowledge is the world."
Our preceding exposition has shown us a For-itself which denies con-

cretely that it is a particular object.

We must now inquire into the nature

of the For-itself which renders possible knowledge of a specific object

against the background of the knowledge of a total world.

It would appear

that knowledge of a "this" is possible if we emphasize some specific
negation against the background of the knowledge of the total world which
is necessarily present.

144
But insofar as the totality is an internal onto-

logical relation of "thises," it can be revealed only in and through the
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individual "thlses."

To phrase it differently then, "the presence
of the

For-itself to the world can be realized only by its
presence to one or
several particular things, and conversely, its
presence to a particular

thing can be realized only on the ground of a presence
to the world.

Insofar as consciousness makes itself be, in the
unity of a single upsurge, the totality which is not being, being stands
before consciousness

as the totality which is not consciousness.

The very meaning of con-

sciousness lies outside in being, yet it is through the
For-itself that the

meaning of being appears.
£jake the

world appear.

Only that which is able to negate is able to

This negation, however, insofar as it involves the

world and "thlses" (In-itself) entails in it an element of externality.
Of external negations such as "a chair is not a table" we have said that

the determining relation resides neither in the chair nor in the table.
The "this" (the chair) and "that" (the table) emerge from the For-itself

through an internal negation.

It is the For-itself that delimits the dumb

and massive In-itself through the act of nlhilation.

fication of Spinoza * s omnis determinatio est negatio .

This is but a modi-

Insofar as the ex-

ternal negation cannot belong to "this" or "that," it cannot be objective;
that is, it cannot belong to the In-itself.

Nor can it have subjective

existence like the pure mode of being of the For-itself which is pure in-

ternal negation.

Thus external negation must remain "in the air" exterior

to the In-itself as well as to the For-itself.

External negation, pre-

cisely because it is exteriority, must be substantiality, yet i-eonically
it cannot be referred to any substance.

It is therefore nothing, its

being is to be summoned by the For-itself.

From this then space cannot be
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regarded as an external relation, since space
is that by which For-itself
realizes ’’this" as external to "that."

The For-itself through its internal

negations knows and delimits '’this" and knows
and delimits "that" such

that it realised "this" as external to "that."

Although the notion of

space supposes the existence of external objects,
it nevertheless is subjective, for it is only by consciousness that
"this" is realised as exter-

nal to "that," and it is this very realization that
constitutes the notion
of space.
b.

The Structures of the In-itself:

Instrumentality.

Quality. Potentiality, and

146

If we wish to characterize more precisely the nature of the
In-itself,

we shall have to consider briefly the structures of the In-itself.
In-itself Sartre ascribes three features; they are:

To the

quality, potentiality,

and instrumentality.
(1) Quality.

1

^

The being of the "this" when considered apart from all external rela-

tions with the world or with other "thises" is nothing other than quality.

Quality is not simply subjective determination, i.e., the yellow of the
lemon is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it

the lemon.

On the other hand, nor can we conceive of an object that appears as pure

and empty form which fuses together its disparate qualities.

The truth of

the matter is that the lemon is extended throughout its qualities and each

of its qualities overlaps each of its other qualities.

"It is the sourness

of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow which is sour."

In the sense

that qualities extend throughout each other, every quality of being is all

.
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being.

Quality

exposes

the absolute contingency of being,
and the appre-

hension of a quality, therefore, does not
add anything to being except the
fact that being is there as ’’this."
’-Quality is the whole of being revealing itself within the limits of the

*

there is.*’’ 149 But in order for a

quality to be, it must be for a nothingness
which is not itself
Quality, then, is revealed to the For-itself.

a quality.

The For-itself, by internal

negations knows (announces to itself) that
which-it-is-not by means of the
quality.
tance.

The quality

’’is

there’’ at a distance and ’’haunts us’’
from a dis-

It is a presence perpetually out of reach, and
it refers us to

ourselves as to an emptiness.

A quality is not some mysterious being
im-

printed upon substance; it is merely the "profile’’ of
being— to-be revealed—
to the For-itself as not-being-the-For-itself
(2)

Potentiality.^ 0

In order to see the notion of potentiality in a clearer light, let us

here recapitulate our previous concept of internal negation.

The For-itself

by applying the act of negation on any In-itself projects itself toward the
future.

The "this" appears as that toward which I project, and as soon as

I apprehend it I have surpassed it.

Indeed, the For-itself is non-thetic

consciousness of itself and the thetic consciousness of being.

And thetic

consciousness of being implies a future dimension; that is, insofar as the

For-itself posits Being-in-itself it escapes toward the future.
mere external negation whereby I assert that at this moment

a

Even in a

chair is not

a table, I hint at the exclusion of the future, and thereby making refer-

ence to the future dimension.

In an internal negation, however, the future

dimension appears more explicitly and in several ways.

Take the example
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whereby I assert that

I

am not this ehair.

sidered as an object on which, in the

Here the ehair may be eon-

more.

I

may or may not sit, further-

more, it possesses traits of permanence. 151
And permanence always Indicates
an elementary view of the more in
things, for in considering an object
as permanent, I go beyond this object
toward the future.

that the

‘

In the manner

or-itself regards the chair as an object for
future sitting, as

a permanent object, etc., it endows
the In-itself with potentiality.

Still

there are other ways that potentialities may
manifest themselves in the Initself.

In the case of the crescent moon we saw
how the For-itself sur-

passed the crescent moon and thereby investing
in the crescent moon the

potentiality of a full moon.

Thus it is by and through the For-itself

that potentialities come to the In-itself.
In regard to possibilities of the For-itself, however,
since they depend
solely on the free choice of the For-itself, their
contrary is always possible.

When

I

regard a particular In-itself from one point of view, I endow
it with

one set of possibilities, and as I regard it from a different point
of view,
I

may endow it with a new set of possibilities.

For instance, I may de-

cide to sit on this particular chair, or I may decide to reduce it to

pieces of wood and use these for firewood.

Thus the possibilities of the

In-itself are nothing but the potentializing view of the For-itself.
How in the notion of the For-itself as the capacity to go beyond things,

Sartre sees the solution to the problem of abstractions . According to
Sartre abstractions as such are never given.

"Green is never green."

i"Jhat

He writes paradoxically,

Sartre meant by this statement was simply that

the existent never possesses its essence as a present quality; instead, it
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points at it.

The essence constitutes the ideal
outlines of a thin*

realized in the most perfect form-it
must always lie beyond consciousness,
it must be that background against which
instances of this essence as manifest in reality appear to consciousness.
If there were such an idealistic

fonn which corresponds to the idealistic
aspiration of the For-itself. it
would be found in beauty . But because the
For-itself is forever insatiable
and appears as a perpetual ’’lack." this ideal
must remain an absence forever.

It is always apprehended as "an absence revealing
itself implicitly

in the imperfections of the world." 1 2
-*

It is appropriate at this point of our analysis
of the structures of

the In-itself to emphasize that these structures
(spaciality, potentiality,
permanence, essence, quality) appear to consciousness as
soon as there is

consciousness.

Furthermore, the In-itself reveals itself not as an indi-

vidual structure but as the totality of its structures.

No singular struc-

ture has any priority over any other? they all appear at once to consciousness.

And there is no unifying factor in the manner of a substance

which is conceived to possess all the structures of the In-itself.
(3) Instrumentality.

1

«

The notion of the -'or— itself as a

in our analysis of the For-itself.

,

'lack ,, has appeared again and again

Here again we must appeal to this con-

cept in order to understand the "drives* and "appetites" so frequently dis1

cussed in psychology.

According to Sartre the notion "drives" must be

understood as the projections from the For-itself into the In-itself, projection emanating from the essential "lack" which constitutes the For-itself.
Drives are not the sort of In-itself existents whiah the psychologists tend
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to favor.

On the level of the consciousness
of the world, this lack can

appear only in projection, as a transcendent
and ideal characteristic which
the world is not. Thus the world is
revealed as haunted by absences to
be realized, and each "this'’ appears with
point to it and determine it.

a

cortege of absences which

These absences are essentially indistin-

guishable from potentialities j however, it is
easier to apprehend their
meaning.

Thus, insofar as the absences determine
"this" as this, the "this"

must point toward the absences, specifically, its
absences.

And since each

absence is an absent In-itself, it points toward other
aspects of its being and toward other beings, and this series of "pointing
toward" is
petrified" (fixed) in In-itself.

Now then, these absences, insofar as they

urge realization and completion bring us to Sartre »s concept
of task .

The

In-itself, although it appears as passive indifference, it nevertheless

indicates a task which can be fulfilled.

And this In-itself as it indi-

cates a task is precisely what Sartre calls a "tool."

This quality of

"instrumentality" enables the transformation of objects into a "world"

which is the correlate of the nihilation which is the For-itself.

The

world of tools appears as the externalized image of the possibilities of the
For-itself projected into the realm of the In-itself.

Thus we have to

recognize the world as derivative from an indifferent background of Reinp-

in—itself -which becomes organized into meaning through the projections of
the For-itself as nihilation.

whereby

I

Indeed, it is by the very act of nihilation,

affirm myself as net being this indifferent realm of Bein “-in-

itself, that I make the world meaningful as the objective correlate of

eternal striving I

etv
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With these analyses Sartre feels that
he has made an advance over
earlier theories, and that he is able
to do justice to both idealism and
realism without falling into their
155
error.
With the idealists he affirms
that the Being-for-itself is genuine
knowledge of Being, but he insists
that knowledge must refer to a real being.
Through the For-itself the In-

itself allows itself to be affirmed.

The function of the For-itself con-

Bists in part in the affirmation of
In-itself through internal negations of

itself as In-itself.

With the realists Sartre asserts that it is
Being

itself which is present to consciousness, but
he maintains that the Foritself adds nothing to the In-itself save the
affirmation that "there is"
an In-itself.

And moreover, in opposition to the realists Sartre
insists

that the lcnower (the For-itself) does not exist as
an absolute and self-

sufficient form of being.

From this we are left to wonder if Sartre is as

much of a realist as he pretends.
ajjd.

It is evident, however, from his Being

d^M-ngpess that Sartre consistently opposes idealism insofar as he

relegates the whole mass of being to the realm of the Being-in-itself
.
in so doing he has emptied the Being-for-itself of all of its being.
he assigns to the For-itself unlimited activities.

But

Yet

The For-itself must

above all make that "there is" being, and it is only through the appari-

tion of the Being— for— itself that there is presence of time and space; in
short, meaning of the world is possible only through the For-itself.

world simply

The

It is the For-itself which through its profusive variety

of ecstasies, through its continual nihiletion and its multiform intentionality, constitutes the world .

The For-itself must perform all these

activities and yet it must remain an empty nothingness; herein lies the

10 ?

paradox.

Sartre appears, from this strict philosophical sense,
to be both a

realist and an idealist, but this is but an unavoidable
consequence in the

development of the fundamental characteristic of his system—
that is the

tension between a Being-in-itself which has nothing to do and
all to be, and
a Being-for-itself which has all to do and nothing
to be.

This nerpetual

opposition which emerges as a consequence of the nature of the two regions

of being is truly characteristic of Sartre* philosophy alone.
s
(3) In-itself and Time.

1

^

In his analysis of the temporality of the world, Sartre remains un—

waiverlngly faithful to his original conception of the two regions of being.
According to Sartre , the succession of time as such does not exist.

The In-

itself exists "in one stretch" through past, present, and future; whereas
the temporality of the For-itself sots itself along the revealed In-itself

which appears as something identical to itself.

Temporality, then, is

nothing but the measure of the permanent identity of the In-itself.

through time that we recognize "this" chair as "this" chair.

It is

Objects inde-

pendent of consciousness simply are , and time flows over them; it is through
consciousness that they have permanence (become temporal).

S'e

need not

elaborate any further on the nature of the temporality of the In-itself.
Our analysis of temporality as it pertains to the For-itself has adequately

demonstrated the one essential point that concerns us, namely, temporality
appears only with the apparition of human consciousness.
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The Impossibility of a Synthesis
/e

have struggled our way through the long and
tortuous road of the

first two parts of Sartre »s Be£n£. and Nothingness
.

Our exposition was an

attempt to render Sartre’s arguments in simpler
language and at the same

time without doing violence to the meaning Sartre intended
to convey.

How-

ever, due to the obscurity of Sartre’s essays,
in many instances we were

forced to use his often fantastic terminology and hence
to forsake our aim
at clarity.

Indeed, every critic who has written on Sartre’s ontology,
to

our knowledge, has denounced the obscurity and complexity of
Sartre’s Seine
and E&frM-nflness.

Now that we have provided this rather lengthy exposition

and have imposed so heavily on the reader’s patience and indulgence,
what

conclusions can we offer?

The question that is put to us with particular

urgency is "What is the predominant theme in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness ?”
More specifically, "What oan we conclude from our analysis of Being-for-

itself and Being-in-itself ?"

To this end let us reassess the main point of

our exegesis.
In the early pages of his Introduction we can already detect Sartre’s

effort to distinguish between the being of oonseiousness and the being of the

phenomenon (transphenomenal being or Being-in-itself , Sartre seems to use
these terms synonymously) .

Here we saw how Sartre, proceeding from a supposed

phenomenological approach, sought to establish explicitly the nature of consciousness and the nature of Being-in-itself and the irreconcilable opposi-

tion between then.

Consciousness for Sartre is always intentional, it always

appears in the form consciousness-of , that is, it is invariably object oriented.
Hence consciousness cannot exist without the object of consciousness, nor can
the object make its appearance without consciousness.

Consciousness Is, more-
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over, immediate consciousness
of self, which is to say.
it is non-positional
consciousness of self. This is precisely
the nature of consciousness as
a

pre-ref lective co^to .

Furthermore, eonscioxisness is the
source of all nega.

lions and therefore it possesses the
power to negate, or in Sartrean
terminology, it can perform the "nihilating
withdrawal” with respect to its
objects.

And since consciousness is the source
of all non-being, it must

itself be a non-being, for according to
Sartre, only that which is itself
a non-being can make non-being happen
to things. Consoiousness then, is
,

the non-being by and through which
non-being comes into the world.

Insofar

as consciousness necessarily posits an
object, the object must in turn re-

quire a consciousness to which it appears; and
this appearing to consciousness emerges as that which is other-than-consciousness,
in other words, the

Being-in-itself appears as not-self.

Being-in-itself is also conceived as

that which really ^s; it rests on the foundation of
its own being.
this

<

And

eing-in-itself is massive, full, dense, opaque, dumb, and brute

existent; it is gratuitous, superfluous, unjustifiable, and
without reason

for being ; it is

’

de trop”; it is radically contingent, it simply is.

Con-

sciousness, then, is conceived as pure non-being (empty being) but at
the
same time it is pure activity; Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is ab-

solutely inactive, yet it is overflowing with being.

With this radical dis-

tinction Sartre hoped to have established the basic structural differences

between the two regions of being and thereby providing the foundation for
his project, namely, to show the impossibility of an eventual synthesis of

the two regions of being, and to show that the For-itself continuously
strives for this unattainable synthesis.
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In his analysis of the different types
of human conduct, Sartre again

sought to expose consciousness as the source
and origin of non-being.

And

fron this Sartre embarked on his venture to
systematically empty the For-

itself of all being.

Our examination of each of the three modes of
human

conduct, namely, interrogation, apprehension of
destruction, and negative

judgment, revealed to us the characteristic feature of
consciousness—its

capacity to generate non-being.
!•

From this we were led to conclude that the

or-itoelf is its own non-being; and as we shall see later, this
conclusion

is unwarranted.
The concept of bad faith once again served primarily to
show how it is

that the For-itself, in its very being, is permeated with nothingness.
Consciousness, as the being permeated by nothingness and as the being from

which non-being emerges, cannot be identified with Being-in-itself which,
,
as such, is full and massive being.

The For-itself is here regarded as the

being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as the being which con-

stantly escapes identification, in contradistinction to the Being-in-itself,

which is exactly what it is and is perpetually identical to itself.

Indeed,

from this perspective, then, any attempt on the part of the For-itself to
synthesize (identify or appropriate, this latter term Sartre sometimes uses
to designate the pursuit of synthesis by the For-itself) the other region
of being, namely the Being-in-itself, will ultimately lead to frustration.

We next considered the immediate structures of the For-itself; these

were impersonality, nonsubstantiality, lack and desire, and values and possibles.

In his discussion of impersonality Sartre concluded that the For-

itself as the being of its own nothingness does not lend itself to any

.

Ill

ecological formulation.

In the section on nonsubstantiality,
Sartre charac-

terized the For-itself as a nonsubstantial
being in contrast to the Cartesian
"thinking substance." In the remaining
two sections on the immediate structures of the For-itself Sartre explored
the concepts of lack, desire, values
and possibles. These four structures, as
we have seen, express the same

fundamental project, that of the For-itself
in its pursuit of a synthesis.
The For-itself as lack, desire, values,
and possibles cries out for com-

pletion and for identification with the
Being-in-itself .

But because the

For-itself is the being of its own nothingness,
this aspiration is, in
principle, unattainable and therefore must remain a
perpetual yearning.

It

should also be noted that the immediate structures
of the For-itself are

stipulated by fundamental structure of the For-itself as
Nothingness, emptiness and non-being.

The immediate structures themselves are but an elabora-

tion of an unavoidable result of the For-itself as Nothingness.
fhe sections devoted to the explication of the notions
of temporality

and reflection proved to be no less explicit in their emphasis on the
radical opposition and the futility of the For-itself »s effort to appropriate

the Being-in-itself , be it in the mode of self-coincidence or in the mode of

identifying itself with an external In-itself
It must now be apparent that when we speak of the For-itself seeking

to appropriate the In-itself, attempting to capture the In-itself, in search

for self-coincidence or self-identification, we mean to express the For-

itself in its unique project of synthesizing itself with Being-in-itself.
These are but different modes of the same project.

This project, however,

must not be confounded with the concept of knowledge.

Knowledge is merely
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* tyPS ° f r6latlon b8tw*«"
Bein,-for-its n lf and Being-ln-ita.lf,
a„d as such
It cannot be understood as a synthesis.
Our discussion on the structures
and temporality of the In-itself
re-

vealed to us the unavoidable conclusion
of Sartre »s phenomenological ontology.

Here, as elsewhere, we must ultimately
recognize that the In-itself

in its many structures (quality, permanence,
potentiality, spatiality. essence, and temporality) appears as soon as
and insofar as there is consciousness.

Consciousness is the underlying condition for
the appearance of Being-

in-itself , which invariably appears as
other-than-consciousness.

created as the

The haitus

very consequence of the natures of the two regions
of

being can never be removed, and yet these beings are
perpetually interdependent, each subsisting only insofar as the other
subsists.

Our attempt

here is aimed at establishing the following thesis,
namely,

for Sartre the synthetic unity of

a

For-itself-in-itself is an ideal and not

realizable structure of experience, moreover his analysis of the
two regions
of Being served primarily to show that such a synthetic unity
would be

flagrant contradiction.

a

In fact the validity, consistence and significance

of his ontological system require the unresolvable dualism of the For-itself

and the In-itself.

In the next few pages we hope to state our case more

forcefully by examining four fundamental structures of the For-itself:

the

For—itself as a nonsubstantial being; as lack; as desire; and as Nothingness
(non-being).
(a)

For-itself as a nonsubstantial being.
In our expository section devoted to the analysis of the notion of non-

substantiality, we stressed that Sartre conceived the For-itself as a non-
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substantial being in contradistinction to Descartes*
“thinking substance."
Consciousness, for Sartre, requires no sustaining "substance"
in order to
be.

If we posit a substantial consciousness we

would, by the same stroke,

introduce elements of Being-in-itself into consciousness and
thereby destroy
consciousness as pure consciousness which can never exist as an autonomous
substance.

sciousness,

A substantial predicate, then, is a priori ruled out
for con-

Sartre *s system cannot accommodate a substantial consciousness,

for in it it appears as a manifest contradiction.
If we postulate a substantial consciousness are we not, in effect, syn-

thesising the two regions of Being?

An autonomous and substantial con-

sciousness would participate in the realm of the For-itself as well as in

the realm of the In-itself.

In suoh an ideal construction the For-itself

would appropriate the 'Being-in-itself in the heart of its own being.

Hence

if this construction were possible in real experience, then we would have
realized the ideal synthetic unity in reality.

Sartre argues that this is not possible.

But, as we have already seen,

It would appear, then, by this

manner of argumentation Sartre sought to expose the untenability of such
postulation in his system.

a

Indeed, by exposing the contradictions entailed

in such a synthesis, Sartre strove to render the unresolvable dualism of
the For-itself and the In-itself.
(b)

For-itself as Lack.
The For-itself as a lack seems to suggest that it is, in some sense,

incomplete.

And insofar as the For-itself is incomplete it seeks and points

at its fulfillment

.

According to Sartre what the For-itself laoks is being,

more explicitly Being-in-itself.

Thus if the For-itself is to be fulfilled
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it must appropriate iieing-in-ltself
In a aynthetle totality.

Such an

appropriation, however, is none other than
the syntheais of the two regions
of 3ein B .

Rut. in Sartre's view, the For-itself
is a perpetual lack whioh

can never be fulfilled or completed, hence,
the For-itself must remain a

lack for eternity.
The For-itself as a lack points at its fulfillment

projects towards the For-itself-in-itself .

,

which is to say, it

And so lone as the For-itself

remains a lack its projection is but an ideal
projection, and the ideal Being (For-itself-in-itself) is that whioh the For-itself
continually strives

for yet never realizes.

What Sartre proposed to do by his analysis of the

For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself , then, was to show that
the unification of the opposing realms of Being is not possible.
(o) For-itself as Desire.

The

i

or-itself as desire like the For-itself as lack, expresses

mental incompleteness.

a

funda-

The For-itself as desire, Sartre tells us, is the con-

tinuous desire to be assimilated with Being-in-itself in a synthetic unity,

and this synthetic unity constitutes that very being (For-itself-in-itself)

which is, in principle, unattainable.

Sartre rejects the notion of desire

as a psychic state, for all psychic states exist in the mode of being which
is exactly that it is, namely, in the mode of Being-in-itself.

But Being-

in-itself is all positivity and therefore complete and fulfilled.
fulfilled desire is no longer a desire.

And a

The For-itself as a continuous desire

demands that it remain forever unfulfilled and incomplete.

Then if we charac-

terize the Being-for-itself as a perpetual desire we must thex*eby conclude
that the For-itself can never be fulfilled and hence never be assimilated
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with the Being-in-itself,

Here as in the previous sections Sartre
has

guided us to the same conclusion#
(d)

For-itself as Nothingness#
Our final illustration pertains to that
structure of the Being-for-

itself which embraces all of the above three
examples.

The For-itself as

nothingness is the very condition which makes the
For-itself as lack, as

desire and as a nonsubstantial being possible.
of the

T

These three characteristics

or-itself participate in the fundamental structure of
the For-

itself; they are but the expressions of the For-itself as
Nothingness.

The

For-itself as Nothingness, then, appears as the structure from
which all its
other structures are derived.
Sartre devoted lengthy sections to substantiate his claim that the
Foritself, in its innermost being, is a non-being.

His discussion of the origin

of negations, of the concept of Nothingness, of bad faith, of the immediate

structures of the Being-f or-itself , of temporality and in a negative sense

even his discussion of the nature of the Being-in-itself were designed to

demonstrate the inescapable emptiness of the For-itself.

If for the present

we grant Sartre this dubious claim (we shall challenge this claim in our
criticism) we must conclude with Sartre, that the For-itself as the being

whose most ohara oteristio feature is its Nothingness can never appropriate
the Being-in-itself.

In other words the For-itself and the In-itself because

of their contradictory natures, can never exist harmoneously in the unity of
a synthetic whole.

And this is precisely to say that a synthesis between the

two regions of Being can never be achieved.

We ought, then, in Sartre* s view,

regard the appropriation of In-itself by the For-itself as an unattainable
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ideal.

Appropriation, then, must remain forever a symbolic yet
impossible

ideal—the For-itself-in-itself

•

This basic dualism can never be resolved.

Ihe ror-itself, as it aspires to be its own foundation, seeks
the status of
7 or-itself-in-itself ; it seeks to be the

Absolute— in short, to be God.

For God, according to Sartre, is precisely this synthesis—the For-itselfin-itself.

From this, then, Sartre writes:

"One can say that what renders

the fundamental project of the human reality most conceivable is that being

who projects himself to be God," 157To be mRn, then, is the fundamental desire
to be God.

Hence, the dialectical relationships between the For-itself and

the In-itself must be understood as this failure to achieve synthesis.

From

this the reader may wonder why Sartre seeks to establish an ultimate reso-

lution of the dualism in the "synthetic liaison."

In this regard he writes

"the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic liaison which
is not other than the For-itself itself."
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This union, however, must be

understood in regard to the genesis of the dualism.

By this union Sartre

merely sought to answer the question "How did the duality arise?"

I59

The For-

itself does not have any autonomous substance to which the In-itself may be

synthesized— it has only its Nothingness—and hence, the ideal project

is

doomed to failure from the start.
In his Conclusion Sartre makes a final attempt to reconcile the two

polarities of Being in an ideal synthesis of Being.

Here Sartre explains that

our previous analysis has shown that understanding of the For-itself presupposes the immediate acknowledgment and consideration of the In-itself,

and vice versa.

And unless an intimate relation exists between them, they would

be mere abstractions.
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'The In-itself and the For-itself are not
juxtaposed. Quite
to the contrary, the For-itself without the
In-itself is
something like an abstraction. It could no more
exist than
a color without form or a sound without
highness and without
timbre; a consciousness which would be consciousness
of noth—
ing -would be an absolute nothing ( nihilum absolutism) "T60
,

The T ’or-itself insofar as it is consciousness (of)
the In-itself must

point to this internal relation which constitutes for Sartre
the essence of
the bond unifying the In-itself and the For-itself.
”If consciousness is linked to the In-itself by an internal
relation, does that net signify that it is articulated with
it in order to constitute a totality and is it not to this
that the name of being or of reality refers? Undoubtedly,
the For-itself is nihilation, but, by virtue of nihilation,
it is; and it is in a priori unity with the In-itself ."*°1
However, despite the fact that this internal relation does provide us a

concept of Being which is a synthetic totality, we are still left with the

dualism as it appears in the existent, which is a For-itself in relation to

an In-itself.
M If

we have to consider the total being as constituted by
the synthetic organization of the In-itself and the Foritself, are we not going to find again the difficulty which
w© wish to avoid? Are we not going to encounter again in the
existent itself the hiatus which we discerned in the concept of being ?»162
Thus Sartre seems to suggest here that the ideal synthesis of Being is

an impossible and self-aontradictory structure, but, nevertheless, if it
should exist, we would enow its structure.
I

The impossibility of a synthesis is the necessary conclusion from the

development of Sartre* s system, and as such we must accept it.

The problem

seems to reside in the Introduction of Sartre* s Hein? and Nothingness .

Here

Sartre introduces a few postulates that are not derivable from a phenomenological basis, and from these he develops an entire ontology.

He charac-

.
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terizes the Being-for-itself as empty of
being but. nevertheless, demands
of it a vast profusion of activities.

On the other hand, the Being-in-

itself is regarded as full and massive being, whose
only function is to be
exactly what it is.

In our next and final chapter we shall concern
ourselves

with evaluating Sartre’s phenomenological method,
some of his postulates,
and some weaknesses in Sartre’s conception
of the Being-for-itself
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PART IV

CRITICISMS

In his Introduction Sartre announced
his project as a "phenomenologi-

cal ontology."

In our critical evaluation we must
determine to what extent

Sartre • s approach is phenomenological
in the strict Husserlian sense.

It

vas in anticipation of this comparison
that we provided a resume' of Husserl's
method. In these following pages we shall
show that, in fact, Sartre has

deviated substantially from Husserl's
phenomenological method, despite the
fact that he has characterized his inquiry as
"phenomenological."
The entire "phenomenological" basis of Being and
Nothingness is to be

found in the Introduction where Sartre developed the
idea of phenomena, the
Being of phenomena, the phenomena of Being, and the
pre-reflective cocito

.

His purpose here, as we have mentioned earlier, is
first to formulate in some

detail the problem of Being; and secondly to establish the
initial distinc-

tion between the two legions of Being.

Since his primary concern is to find

a solution for the problem of Being by means of
phenomenological ontology,

Sartre began with a discussion of the phenomena of Being and the Being
of
phenomena.

And his consideration of the pre-ref lective cogito and of con-

sciousness as opposed to the Being-in— itself was meant to serve as a prelimi-

nary introduction for an eventual establishment of this fundamental dualism.
We must now ask:

"Is the analysis of the structures of the two regions of

Being derive 1 from a purely phenomenological basis?"
To begin with, in his analysis of Being, Sartre rejects both the tech-

niques of epoche and reductions, for as a realist Sartre cannot leave this

problem of existence suspended or "bracketed out."

In fact, Sartre holds that
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the Husserlian reductions are not the proper
method to begin the analysis 0 f
being. In his analysis of consciousness Sartre
borrows Husserl* s notion
of

,,

intentionality,’

,l63

but he argues that Husserl's theory of intention-

ality lends itself to two interpretations:

“Either we understand by this

that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its
object, or else it
signifies that consciousness in its most profound nature
is in rapport

with a transcendental being. "^As we have seen Sartre adopts the latter
interpretation and claims that Husserl's theory, in its first interpretation,
leads ultimately to a transcendental idealism which would make
reality sub10
jectively created and unreal. taking Husserl's notion of
intentionality as

his point of departure, Sartre develops his own peculiar "ontological proof"
of transcendent being.
something:

He writes:

"Consciousness is consciousness of

This signifies that transcendence is the constitutive structure

of consciousness, i.e., consciousness originated carried in a being which is

not it.

It is this which we call the ontological proof

And "To say that

consciousness is consciousness o£ something signifies that for consciousness

there is no being outside this precise obligation to be a revealing intui-

tion of something, i.e., a transcendent being;... for a revealing intuition
implies a revealed.

Absolute subjectivity can only be constituted in the

face of a revealed; immanence can be defined only in the seizure of a transcendent.

nl ^

Whatever other merits such a form of argumentation may have, it is

clearly not phenomenological in the rigid Husserlian sense.

There has been

no reduction, and consequently the examined content of subjectivity remains
impure, contaminated by the "natural attitude."

If Sartre has not remained
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faithful to the Russarli&n phenomenological method, how may we characterize
his method?

On this account Eatanson writes:

"The nature of Sartre *s

method may be characterized as qussi-phenomeno logical and
intuitive ...
Sartre does not use the term "intuition" in the Kantian sense
of Anschauung
but rather in the sense of felt necessity which accompanies
an inspiration

of such experiences as ‘revealed* ontological truth, which is the heart
of
oartre*s method.

In contrast to hypothetico-deduetive types of philosophies,

revealed ontology is an exploitation of the subject-pole of experience; in
contrast to liusserlian phenomenology, ontological revelation does not begin

with a formal epochs and does not have a precise methodology.
Ihus Sartre, attending to the demands of realism, went beyond phenomenon

to postulate a massive Being-in-itself .

Starting from the phenomenon and

the notion of intent! onality, he concluded that Being-in-itself is.

By ascrib-

ing this ontological status to the objects of consciousness, Sartre has gone

far beyond Husserl, who confined himself to a coherent systemization of
phenomena.

It is understandable why Sartre, who claims to be a realist of

sorts, must somehow arrive at the existence of concrete and massive being;

however, it seems somewhat audacious to begin with the phenomenon and hope

to arrive at concrete being.

If we recall, phenomenology purports merely to

describe that which appears, yet Sartre assures us that the Being-in-itself
"overflows" its appearance.
this.
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One wonders, as a phenomenologist, how he knows

His notion of "transphenomena lity" expresses this same idea.
In this connection Roger Troifontaines writes in his le Ghojx de Jean-

Paul Sartre:

:
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"The phenomenon from which one starts
manifests itself at
once as a relation between two transphenomenal
beines; consciousness on the one hand and the objective
condition of
a
B
feS
n °n the other * Is on« consistent then,
with the method of phenomenology, when one
asserts that a
being which appears only in relation to
consciousness is
non-relative to consciousness? Granted that
relation as
a term implies a degree of autonomy
that belongs to the
eing-ir-itself , yet is it not a palpable extrapolation
to
make it into an absolute and to cut it from all*
relations?
Is it not yet another equally obvious
extrapolation to declare it non-cons clous, inert, massive , simply
because it
is other than
consciousness?.,. The question comes down
to this
by what right does one place beyond all relation
an In-itself which is known only through a relation ?«*7®

i^ !r

^^°

:

On this point Gabriel Marcel makes the following comment:
I here is reason to believe that
the source of the contradiction is to be found in the unclear introduction to the work
Nothingness ) . This source seems to me to lie in
what H. Sartre in a dangerously ambiguous phrase, designates
as 'the transphenoraenality of being. 1
Contrary to what might
be expected this word in no way refers to anything that resembles Kant's Djng-an-slch ( thing-in-itself ). The transphenomenal
being of phenomena is the being of this table, of this pack of
tobacco, of the lamp, and more generally the being of the world
implied by consciousness. What consciousness requires is simply that the being of that which appears should not exist solely
insofar as it appears ... It is difficult to see how the transphenomenality of being could be anything but a figment invented
by a mode of thinking which has not yet fully succeeded in unfolding its own meaning. ”^-71
11

likewise C. E. Magny questions:
’’Upon what do the initial analyses rest, what is our guarantee
for their validity? >iust they be taken as postulate or as grounds
of evidence, or how else?”^-^

Desan in his The Tragic vinale remarks
’’Sartre's proof of the existence and massiveness of Being-in
itself is certainly not apodictic ... My own opinion is that
this initial start is not a fora of evidence but is something
far more like a postulate .” 1

^

Indeed it seems that Sartre has relied on what Natanson calls an ’’intuition. ’’^^It is clear that with this attempt Sartre hoped to have avoided
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idealism and ultimately solipsism.

But to depart from a phenomenological

basis, as Sartre did, irreconeiliable
contradictions become inevitable.

Sartre »s entire exploration of the Being-for-itself
is partially aimed

at sustaining this postulate.

For if Sartre can succeed in showing that

the For-itself is truly empty of all being, then
it follows that if there
is being it must neoessarily be found in the realm
of Being-in-itself

these are the only two regions of Being Sartre admits.

since

Hence, we must now

determine how successful Sartre has been in his attempt to
sustain his views

that non-being resides in the For-itself—which is itself a non-being—
and
that this

I

or-itself is impersonal and nonsubstantial.

-artre begins with the discussion of three types of human conduct:

interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative judgment.

And with

each notion Sartre introduces non-being under one form or another.

From the

notion of interrogation, Sartre concluded that every interrogation presupposes an ignorance (absence of knowledge) on the part of the one who questions,

and this absence of knowledge is a form of non-being which is incarnated in
consciousness itself.

Can we allow this?

If we accept the term "non-

being” to imply the idea of Motherness/’^^than clearly we cannot accept
Sartre* s conclusion.

But if we understand non-being to mean non-existence or
17

non-existent; or absence, privation, lack or negation of existence or existent,

then Sartre's conclusion does not appear to be a blatant sophism after all,
since this is precisely Sartre's characterization of non-being.

embrace the existential definition of non-being:

vn
of negation";
is,"
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f

:,

And if we

"ton-being is the source

Non-being is the complete negation of the totality of what

then we must concede to Sartre that absence (negation) of knowledge

*
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does in fact imply a non-being which emerges
from consciousness.

Likewise,

if we admit that negative judgment is a form
of non-being, then we must ul-

timately recognize that non-being emerges from the
human consciousness.

With

the concept of destruction Sartre sought to
illustrate the same point, namely,

©very instance of an apprehension of destruction a
form of non-being is introduced.

Since the apprehension of destruction presupposes the
acknowledgment

or recognition of a state of affairs prior to destruction,
which is no longer
and hence the appearance of a for® of non-being, in human
consciousness,
Sartre concluded that with every instance of destruction a
non-being is

thereby introduced.

And since only human consciousness can apprehend de-

struction and that state of affairs which no longer exists, it follovs,
for
^artre, that consciousness is the being by and through which non-being emerge.
Ibis assertion does not pose any difficulty, our question is how does Sartre

justify his claim that the being from which non-being emerges must itself be
a non-being.

The problem for Sartre, then, is to justify his identification

of this non-being as human consciousness.

Sartre claims that "that by which

non-being comes into the world, must be its own non-being

M ^^hence

con-

sciousness must itself be a non-being from which other non-beings emerge.

Again he argues:

"The Being by which Non-being arrives in the world must

nihilate Non-Being in its Being, and even so it still runs the risk of

establishing Non-being as

a

transcendent (absence of being) in the very heart

of immanence (presence of being) unless it nihilates Non-being in its being

in connection with its own

beim

•

n

1 ftft

the world must be its own Non-being."

"The Being by which Non-being comes to

181
,
'
Sartre seems to be arguing that only

"what-is-not-Being-in-itself" is able to apprehend "what-is-Being-in-itself ,"
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and because Being-in-itself is full, impregnable,
and massive being, non-

being cannot reside in Being-in-itself.

Thus, insofar as we can conceive

of non-being, it must be located in consciousness.

And since non-being can

only emerge from that which is itself non-being, it follows, then,
consciousness must be its own non-being.
'v^an

we accept Sartre’s claim that

which is itself a non-being 1
1

?"

*

Our problem is reduced to this:

non—being can emerge only from that

Let us consider this problem.

we cannot say of non-being that it is . for it does not possess

that ontological status which is characteristic only of being, therefore,

we cannot conceive of it as an autonomous existent in the manner Sartre does.

We can speak of non-being only as a concept which emerges from consciousness.
And because the human consciousness is (or has) a faculty which is able to
compare, to divide, to abstract, to construct and reconstruct, to penetrate

the past, to foresee the future, to view its possibles, and so on, it can

formulate the concept of non-being.

If consciousness were indeed a non-

being, one wonders how it is possible for such a consciousness to perform

the numerous activities assigned to it.

An active non-being is a manifest

absurdity.
Secondly, the concept of non-being clearly has some ontological status,

such that we can say that it is without violating the fiat of reason.

Hence,

we can conceive of non-being in the manner of a concept, which posits a
consciousness which nevertheless is not itself a non-being.

Sartre's iden-

tification of consciousness and non-being would then appear to be a superfluous postulate.

Here, as in the case of the transphenomenal being, Sartre

has essentially relied on an "intuition" rather than rigorous and systematic

.

,

,
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phenomenological analysis to which he avowed fidelity.

In his exploration

of the notion of bad faith Sartre sought to
establish the For-itself as a

being which can direct its negations toward itself,
that is, it recognizes

itself as a being which is not what it is and is what
it is not, a being

which continually escapes block identity, eoncretization,
statufication
permanence and so on.

And with this Sartre hoped to have, more forcefully,

established the lor-itself as a being which is permeated with
nothingness;
a being which is in its innermost being, a non-being.

conclusion?

Can we allow this

If we accept Sartre *s characterization of the For-itself as a

being which continually escapes block identity, eoncretization, statufieation, etc. can we infer from this a being which is permeated with nothing-

ness?

In his discussion of bad faith Sartre speaks of ”mv deceiving m^-

awakening to

myself

1

’

:

and so on.

I am nothing?

cynicism" ; "m£ playing to be something other than

In this context what could Sartre be referring to if

That the For-itself continually escapes block identity, con-

cretization, permanency, statufication and ultimately all enclosed defini-

tion is due to the continuous flux of experiences which enriches it and to

which it is assimilated, and not, as Sartre asserts, because it is a nonbeing in its innermost being.

Hence, Sartre* s arguments on this point are

untenable
Our discussion on the notion of "intentionality" led us to conclude that

for Sartre consciousness must always be consciousness of something.

Moreover,

consciousness must be essentially different from the object of consciousness.

And since the object of consciousness is none other than the Being-in-itself
which as such is full and massive being, Sartre concluded that consciousness
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must be in the node of non-being.

Granted consciousness as that which
is

other than Being-in-itself must be
nonsubstantia 1 and different from the
objects of consciousness, but it does not
follow from this that it is itself
a non-being in the sense of not being a
real entity.

It would have been far

more plausible to postulate a being of consciousness
whose being is essen-

tially different from the Being-in-itself (which
appears as the object of
consciousness ) yet nevertheless receives from the
Being-in-itself intelligible determinations in a non-material way.

eliminated the necessity for postulating
sic essential structure of consciousness.

a

In this manner it would have

non-being manifesting an intrinThis, however, is not possible

for Sartre, such a postulation would disrupt the consistency of his
system.
or

-

art re, that the For-itself is a non-being in the heart of its being
is

a necessary consequence of the For-itself as a nonsubstantial
being; for
us, however, this does not follow.

Nor does the power to negate or nihilate,

which according to Sartre is inherent in every consciousness, require it to
be, in its innermost being, a non-being.

On the contrary, the capacity to

to negate demands that consciousness be a real existing human consciousness,

for to negate is to think, and to think requires nothing short of a being

which in some sense is .

We must ultimately recognize that "being" is an

all-inclusive term, and it does not lend itself to the sort of abstractions
of which one might conceive in terms such as "mineral," "animal," or "rational# H

being.

/e

must conclude, then, that consciousness is not its own non-

If human consciousness is not itself a non-being, then what sort

of "being" is it?

This question leads us to our next point of discussion;

we must now consider Sartre* s denial of any egological structure of con-

12P

sciousness.
V/e

have seen how Sartre has asserted, with
unwnivering consistency,

that consciousness is a nonentity (not a real
being) and that it is merely
a series of functions, which as such are
but a continual negation.

It is

through "internal negations" that the external world
is made to appear; as
negation, then, the For-itself is nothing but the
revelation of Being-in-

itself,

horeovor, this possibility to negate requires as its
absolute pre-

requisite an internal void in consciousness.

Non-being, in fact, is the

condition of all negative judgments, interrogations, lcnowledge and
so on.
As the For-itself is present to something, it is a continual
nihilation
(A6afl*4 sa tion)

Consciousness as a non-being cannot sustain the existence

.

of a permanent and underlying entity.

The apprehension of a feeling of

personal identity through time, 'art re claims, is but the "transversal"

and "intentional" activity of the For-itself which succeeds in transmitting
to the present concrete and real remembrances of the past.

Sartre, then,

denies the existence of an Ego in consciousness.
In rejecting the Ego or the permanent Self, Sartre stands in opposition

to both Descartes and Kant.

Descartes, in formulating his

"

Corrito ergo sum ."

departed from the reflexive corrito . and thus established the Self ac a
thinking self.

Hence the supposition of an "Ego" in the center of our think-

ing is explicit.

Kant, too, in his transcendental theory considered the

self to be an inscrutable subject presupposed by the unity of empirical selfconsciousness.
Husserl.

182

Moreover, by repudiating the Ego Sartre sets himself against

Indeed, Husserl’s systematic phenomenology is essentially a descrip-

tion of the cogitatum as it appears to the

%o

which is regarded as the
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unifying element.
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Husserl in this connection, asserts:

"The

:zo stun

must be considered apodictic.
-artre, then, rejects all egological formulations
for consciousness;

however, as we shall subsequently show, he is not
consistent in maintaining
this position, and, moreover, there are disadvantages
to such a position.

Varet has cogently captured this point in his
L'Ontologie de

i‘irst,

:

:g£fr re
.

;

-artre acknowledges the distinction between authentic
reflection

anct^'
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£r£rr?flectj.ye c^^to.

J

We have seen that in authentic reflection conscious-

ness explicitly and clearly reflects on itself and posits
itself; that is,
in every act of cognition, I know that I know something.

Hence, in any act

of authentic reflection, I encounter and posit the Ego; for here knowledge

appears as

nj£

knowledge of myself as the being who knows.

Sartre cannot escape the presence of the

%o

And because

in authentic reflection, he

deviously sought to avoid this problem by developing his entire ontology by
means of the pre-reflective cogito .

By utilizing the concept of pre-reflectivo

cogjto instead of authentic reflection, Sartre would have bypassed the prob-

lem of the dyadic reflecting-reflected; and hence, he need not posit a

scissiparity
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in consciousness.

But by the mere fact that Sartre recog-

nized the notion of authentic reflection, he has engendered in consciousness
a scissiparity— the encounter with the Ego is, therefore, unavoidable.

Cn

this point there is an obvious lack of consistency on the part of Sartre.
Secondly, the resolute conviction with which I assert that

I_

am does

not seeem to give wav even in face of the subtlety of Sartrean dialectic.

Although, strictly speaking, it is virtually impossible to prove such an
assertion, it is at least as certain, if not more so than, Sartre* s 'Intui-
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tions."

Sartre would probably argue that consciousness
is nothin? but

‘•revelation of

•

“laok of

itself is Nothingness.

.

..,“ “desire for ...," Eeing-in-itself
it
;

However, it is apparent that “revelation of ...

“

“lack of ...,“ and other such relations presuppose an
inescapable terminus
a guo and ad guem which is none other than the
Ego who negates, desires,

lacks, and so on.

Sartre has characterized the For-itself as

a

permanent

lack of Being-in— itself and a permanent desire to appropriate
Bein?r-in-

itself .

The For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself admittedly manifests a

form of being essentially different from Being-in-itself but by this
,
verv
fact we must conceive of it as a being rather than

a

non-being.

In like

manner the For-itself as desire for Beinsr-in-itself expresses the idea of one
form of being which desires another form of being; in short we must postulate both the being that desires and the being that is desired.

Thirdly, by the very fact that exteriority delimits and specifies

consciousness, consciousness must exercise the acts of awareness.

For in-

stance, in the notion of “spatiality,” Sartre may be right when he asserts

that the notion of space is meaningless apart from a human consciousness

which realizes “this” as external to “that.”

But it is only because con-

sciousness is a permanent Center that it can effect a unification of the

external objects in a spatial relation.

And also the feeling of personal

identity in the temporal unity of past and present cannot be adequately
explained without positing a Subject who is able to unify past and present.
This feeling of personal identity is nothing but the expression of perma-

nence in consciousness, and a non-being could hardly possess any sort of
permanence or identity.

It is difficult to understand how Sartre could, on
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the one hand, accept the existence
of a past for the For-itself
f
the other hand, reject permanence in
consciousness.

W

yet. on

With these comments,

then, can we still be satisfied with
Sartre's empty and impersonal For-

itself devoid of all being?
to be apodictic.

Sartre's repudiation of the Ego does not seem

Nor is his characterization of the For-itself
as having

do and nothing to be convincing.

*11

Throughout Sartre's Being and Nothingness he speaks
of "my possible."

'my desire," "my past," and so on.
in this manner if I an nothfo.g.

One wonders how he can refer to the I

Furthermore, in the entire section devoted

to the concept of "bad faith," Sartre exploits the
ontological dualism of

the

2.

and the Other , and he also defines bad faith as an act
wherein

hide the truth from myself .

project to empty the

?

I

It would appear that Sartre has failed in his

or-itself of all being, and that the For-itself is

not as empty and impersonal as Sartre would have us believe.
If our exegesis has succeeded in showing that Sartre's efforts were

devoted to placing the whole ontological mass on the side of Being-in-

itself and concomitantly extracting from Being-for-itself all being, only
to demonstrate that ultimately a synthesis between the Being-for-itself and

the Being-in-itself is impossible, then we must conclude that Sartre has
failed.

For we cannot accept Sartre's characterization of Being-for-

itself, and nor can we allow Sartre to affirm by means of an intuitive pos-

tulate the existence of the transphenomenal being*

Sartre's conception of

Being, although unique in the history of philosophy, has not been adequately

substantiated.

From these conclusions, then, Sartre's idea of the impossible

synthesis has no meaning for us.

Sartre may be correct when he affirms that
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an ultimate synthesis between the two
regions of Being is impossible, and
indeed it would be an insurmountable task
to attempt to resolve the
Subject-Object dualism by means of a reconciliation
of the two polarities

of Being; however, Sartre with his analysis
of Being has not succeeded
in showing that such a synthesis is unattainable.

Although Sartre has

failed in his original project he has succeeded
in showing the limits of
phenomenology.

He has shown that phenomenology as a philosoohical
disci-

pline is incompatible with realism, and that as a
purely descriptive method

it may occasionally lose itself in the subjectivity of
the philosopher who

applies this method,

Jrora

Sartre’s failure it becomes apparent to us that

phenomenology is not the only approach to the solution of the
problem of
Being and therefore the problem of consciousness.
i'ifinv

philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of Being from a

phenomenological basis, among them are Jasners, Heidegger, and Sartre, and
each one of them arrived at a different conclusion.

This should indicate

to us that phenomenology does not prescribe a definitive conclusion, and

that the theories and conclusion obtained from

a

phenomenological basis

depend primarily on the disposition of the individual philosopher.
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The Sartrean For-itself is roughly equivalent to Heidegger*s Dasein,
though Sartre stresses the role of the For-itself as consciousness.
Both philosophers, however, regard human reality in terras of an active
concern with itself and not-seli.

79*

BN, p. Ixv.

80.

BN, p. Ixvi.
Insofar as the In-itself simply is, it is natural for
Sartre to concentrate on the For-itself. Thus, like Heidegger, Sartre
begins with “existent which we ourselves are.” Sartre *s characterization of the Being-in-itself is puzzling. From a phenomenological point
of view, Sartre can hardly substantiate his positing a Being-in-itself
much less his attempt to characterize it.

81.

BN, p. b*

82.

Ibid .

Unlike Heidegger Sartre is concerned with the human
existents as consciousness. For Heidegger* s definition of the Dasein
of. supra pp. 42 ff.

,

p. 4.
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90.
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*2 emphasize the fact that ‘'destruction” is a human term;
t
the
term "destruction" acquires full significance
only when it is
supported by human presence and human apprehension.
And if we ar^ue
with critics such as Jean VJahl (Deucalion,
1:47) against Sartre by
affirming that destruction can occur in the absence
of human witness,
then we would have missed the point.
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Further on his essay Sartre identifies non-being with the
human consciousness itself. In our criticism we shall show that this
position
is altogether untenable.

;'S
that

.
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pp. 39-47, and BN pp
16— 21 .
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Sartre *s "neantisation" is very similiar to Heidegger* s Nichtunr . and
moreover, Sartre's formulation of "le neant se neantise" reminds us of
Heidegger’s famous "Nothing nihilates itself."

95.

BN, p. 23.
From the fact that all non-being emerge from the human consciousness it does not follow that human consciousness itself is a nonbeing. For a detailed discussion on this point see the section on
criticism.

96 .

If we acknowledge an egological structure for the human consciousness,
which Sartre maintains, then Sartre's argument that there is nothing
in my consciousness which lends itself to determination falls. Cf
supra section on criticism. In this light Sartre's absolute freedom
seems somewhat less than apodictic.

97* Sartre's notion of "angoisse" invites comparism to Heidegger's notion
of "Angst." For Heidegger's notion cf. supra . pp. 40-43.
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pp. 59 -60 .

109«

Ibid .

.

p. 62.

110.

This condition clearly cannot prevail, since by acknowledging that he
is what he is he has surpassed this condition such that he is no longer
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Ibid ., pp. 73-77.
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The Tragic Finale , p. 28.

118.

Sartre’s arguments against all egologieal structures for the human
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119.
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This, however, in no way suggests that
human consciousness is itself

a non-being.
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BN, pp. 95-105
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Existentialist Thought , p. 107.
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Heidegger's treatment of the "world."
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136.

It is clear why Sartre adhered to his concept of the pre-reflective
cogito instead of the notion of authentic reflection throughout his
essay, since in so doing he hoped to have avoided the difficulties
that Descartes had to face. But by the very fact that Sartre aekknowledged such a notion as the authentic reflection he has, to this
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